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Repurposing Software Defenses with Specialized Hardware
Kanad Sinha
Computer security has largely been the domain of software for the last few decades. Although
this approach has been moderately successful during this period, its problems have started becom-
ing more apparent recently because of one primary reason — performance. Software solutions
typically exact a significant toll in terms of program slowdown, especially when applied to large,
complex software. In the past, when chips became exponentially faster, this growing burden could
be accommodated almost for free. But as Moore’s law winds down, security-related slowdowns
become more apparent, increasingly intolerable, and subsequently abandoned. As a result, the
community has started looking elsewhere for continued protection, as attacks continue to become
progressively more sophisticated.
One way to mitigate this problem is to complement these defenses in hardware. Despite lacking
the semantic perspective of high-level software, specialized hardware typically is not only faster,
but also more energy-efficient. However, hardware vendors also have to factor in the cost of inte-
grating security solutions from the perspective of effectiveness, longevity, and cost of development,
while allaying the customer’s concerns of performance. As a result, although numerous hardware
solutions have been proposed in the past, the fact that so few of them have actually transitioned
into practice implies that they were unable to strike an optimal balance of the above qualities.
This dissertation proposes the thesis that it is possible to add hardware features that com-
plement and improve program security, traditionally provided by software, without requiring ex-
tensive modifications to existing hardware microarchitecture. As such, it marries the collective
concerns of not only users and software developers, who demand performant but secure products,
but also that of hardware vendors, since implementation simplicity directly relates to reduction in
time and cost of development and deployment. To support this thesis, this dissertation discusses
two hardware security features aimed at securing program code and data separately and details
their full system implementations, and a study of a negative result where the design was deemed
practically infeasible, given its high implementation complexity.
Firstly, the dissertation discusses code protection by reviving instruction set randomization
(ISR), an idea originally proposed for countering code injection and considered impractical in
the face of modern attack vectors that employ reuse of existing program code (also known as
code reuse attacks). With Polyglot, we introduce ISR with strong AES encryption along with
basic code randomization that disallows code decryption at runtime, thus countering most forms
of state-of-the-art dynamic code reuse attacks, that read the code at runtime prior to building the
code reuse payload. Through various optimizations and corner case workarounds, we show how
Polyglot enables code execution with minimal hardware changes while maintaining a small attack
surface and incurring nominal overheads even when the code is strongly encrypted in the binary
and memory.
Next, the dissertation presents REST, a hardware primitive that allows programs to mark mem-
ory regions invalid for regular memory accesses. This is achieved simply by storing a large, pre-
determined random value at those locations with a special store instruction and then, detecting
incoming values at the data cache for matches to the predetermined value. Subsequently, we show
how this primitive can be used to protect data from common forms of spatial and temporal memory
safety attacks. Notably, because of the simplicity of the primitive, REST requires trivial microar-
chitectural modifications and hence, is easy to implement, and exhibits negligible performance
overheads. Additionally, we demonstrate how it is able to provide practical heap safety even for
legacy binaries.
For the above proposals, we also detail their hardware implementations on FPGAs, and and
discuss how each fits within a complete multiprocess system. This serves to give the reader an
idea of usage and deployment challenges on a broader scale that goes beyond just the technique’s
effectiveness within the context of a single program.
Lastly, the dissertation discusses an alternative to the virtual address space, that randomizes
the sequence of addresses in a manner invisible to even the program, thus achieving transparent
randomization of the entire address space at a very fine granularity. The biggest challenge is to
achieve this with minimal microarchitectural changes while accommodating linear data structures
in the program (e.g., arrays, structs), both of which are fundamentally based on a linear address
space. As a result, this modified address space subsumes the benefits of most other spatial random-
ization schemes, with the additional benefit of ideally making traversal from one data structure to
another impossible. Our study of this idea concludes that although valuable, current memory safety
techniques are cheaper to implement and secure enough, so that there are no perceivable use cases
for this model of address space safety.
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Since the first stack overflow based computer worm was first launched by Robert Morris in 1988,
attackers have developed ever sophisticated techniques for bypassing program security, while the
defenders continuously try to develop measures to thwart them. Historically, this has resulted in
a fascinating trend of cat-and-mouse, so that attackers and defenders are always engaged in an
adversarial battle of one-upmanship. However, despite the best efforts of security researchers,
attacks are still widely prevalent costing organizations and users significant economic loss. While
there are many reasons for this, two major factors have persistently contributed to this state of
affairs over the long-term.
First, as sophisticated as attack techniques are becoming, it is trivial compared to the rate at
which the complexity of commercial software has grown. For instance, a modern browser in-
cludes a Javascript engine/interpretor, PDF viewer, multiple extensions, etc., is written in several
languages, and has tens of millions of lines of code. More complexity implies a higher density of
bugs, lower test coverage, and a larger attack surface. Pre-deployment detection of errors via test-
ing and validation techniques have come a long way in the recent past with significant research and
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development being done in the areas of rapid bug detection with tools like AddressSanitizer [100],
larger test coverage with various forms of fuzzing, limiting the scope of bugs/attacks with soft-
ware fault isolation, and so on. Even so, the state-of-the-art in validation lags far behind still,
and is nowhere close to accounting for the discovery of all bugs and their scope of exploitation in
production software.
Another reason for this is the prevalence of memory-unsafe languages like C and C++, which
do not abstract away the address space and allow the program direct access to memory and its
contents. Unmitigated access to raw memory means bugs have a higher scope of impact since no
checks are built in at the language level to prevent semantically illegitimate accesses. The fact
that they have been around for decades also means that there is a significant legacy code base of
these languages. Although many type-safe languages have been developed since, prevalence of
legacy code and the speed advantage enjoyed by these unmanaged languages has resulted in their
continuing popularity among developers in the present and foreseeable future.
In response, security engineers have amassed a rich body of safety measures that aim to counter
attacks while being minimally intrusive on the program. Traditionally, these techniques have pri-
marily been implemented at various levels of software ranging from compiler-based static analyses
to runtime defensive monitors. Besides some basic hardware support like that for paging, this has
remained the status quo for the past few decades, wherein software has borne the brunt of the
responsibility for security. However, due to multiple factors, performance being foremost among
them, software-based security has not scaled well. As developers stack ever-increasing number
of features, while seeking to keep performance overheads at a minimum, it is thus the case that
security mechanisms are the ones that get side-tracked or abandoned.
To overcome this problem, hardware designers have lately picked up the gauntlet by providing
features that either augment existing security schemes or implement them in its entirety. Employ-
ing special hardware for this purpose is highly promising since it potentially mitigates the critical
issue of performance faced by software solutions. This has led to proposal of numerous hard-
ware based security solutions in the last decade. Furthermore, as the cost of failure and economic
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demand for safety rises, hardware vendors have jumped into the fray, announcing numerous in-
struction set architecture (ISA) extensions. Consequently, major design houses like Intel, ARM,
and SPARC have introduced features to combat memory errors [3, 48, 53], pointer corruption [97],
control flow integrity [27], isolated execution [75, 84], etc. in recent years.
As heartening as this trend might seem, we have to ask ourselves one crucial question: for all
the advantages that specialized hardware provides and the number of hardware solutions proposed
so far, why are more of them not seen in deployment today or even included in future microproces-
sor iterations? The answer partially lies in the process of hardware design and the considerations
that go into it. Due to the long time-to-market (of the order of a few years typically), longevity of
architectural specifications, and relative immutability of hardware, vendors are hesitant in adding
new features if their effectiveness on deployment is uncertain. This is more pronounced when the
solution in question is complex, so that integrating it into existing designs becomes intrusive, ex-
pensive, and difficult to validate. Hence, the fact that most previously proposed solutions have not
translated to commercial implementations implies that hardware security researchers have not hit
the right trade off of the aforementioned criteria favorably.
To this end, my research has sought to explore and enable the design of hardware features
that are simultaneously effective as security measures, while requiring simple modifications to
hardware, thus increasing their chances of deployment. Three case studies are presented in this
dissertation that look at different approaches to securing program code and data against external
exploitation. Of the three, two are positive studies wherein the first discusses a technique for se-
curing code against runtime disambiguation and injection, whereas the second discusses a solution
for practically securing data against malicious memory corruption and manipulation. The third
case study presents a negative result involving a technique that seeks to secure the address space
as a whole against unwanted memory disclosures, but the implementation overhead was found to
be too high, thus making it impractical. With these studies, I hope to motivate the central thesis
of this dissertation that asserts the design of low overhead, low complexity, yet effective hardware
solutions to augment system security.
3
1.1 Software Based Defenses
1.1.1 Why Software?
Software based defensive schemes have been and remain the norm in the computer security, and for
good reason. Software is cheap to develop, deploy, and update. Thus, the time from the discovery
of a bug, to the development of its patch, to pushing the updates to client systems is fairly quick and
the process easy. In fact, most software systems are engineered and maintained to accommodate
such operations, with advances currently being made in even live patching of systems without any
downtime. This is especially critical for security patches, since some of these bugs can be exploited
en masse within a short period (especially for web-facing programs), thus increasing their fallout.
Additionally, since software solutions have access to the high-level semantic information of the
program, they are easier to reason about and apply. For instance, consider a simple buffer overflow.
At the level of the language, the notion of bounds exists and hence, it is easier to determine when
they have been violated. This information is absent at the machine level where all that is visible
is a flat memory space. Hence, a defense against overflows is potentially easier to implement at
the language level, than anywhere below. Consequently, a whole slew of compiler-based software
tools have been developed [38, 39, 62, 81] to ensure memory safety for C-based programs. In fact,
even hardware based defenses often rely on semantic information passed down to enforce bounds
more accurately [36, 79, 105].
A third reason is probably just awareness and the lack of efficient collaboration among soft-
ware and hardware researchers. Software bugs are easier fixed by people who understand software
and how/what attack vectors are/can be utilized to exploit them. Traditionally, software developers
have not had a good understanding of hardware microarchitecture or at least, do not have an open
channel of communication with hardware developers. Vice versa applies for hardware develop-
ers, who are generally unaware of security concerns in software, and do not necessarily have the
“hacker mindset”. They have only been concerned with power and performance which is what the
market has demanded of them thus far. The ramifications of this lack of awareness among hard-
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ware designers was made painfully clear with the discovery of the Spectre [60] and Meltdown [68]
attacks, which are a direct consequence of some fundamental tenets of out-of-order processing,
namely speculative execution. Thus, the insular nature of software and hardware development has
contributed to an absence of cross-disciplinary approaches to mitigating persistent and potentially
forward-looking threat vectors effectively.
1.1.2 Can it Keep Up with Attacks?
For the past several decades, semiconductor technology has progressed in accordance withMoore’s
law, giving users exponential increments in performance year-on-year without any modifications
to code whatsoever. This blanket speedup of general purpose computation allowed increasingly
complicated and feature-rich applications to be deployed with nominal to no overhead apparent
to the user. Software-based security also benefited from this phenomenon; as these defenses be-
came more complex and hence, more compute- and/or memory-intensive, their overhead could be
accommodated due to faster execution speeds. However, as Moore’s law comes to an end, other
avenues for speeding up selective aspects of execution are now being explored (multicores, ac-
celerators, etc.). Although some specialized hardware modules for security have been developed
(TPMs [117], for instance), this new trend has had little to no positive effect on software secu-
rity. As a result, users are hesitant to employ software defense schemes that may be secure but
slow down the system noticeably. This is undesirable since contemporary attacks have evolved in
sophistication to the point that current defenses are not effective enough. Attackers are not only
exploiting the previous attack vectors in intelligent ways, but are also continuously inventing novel
ones. For instance, if we look at the root causes for remote code execution in Microsoft software
in the last few years [125], we see that not only are the classic memory attacks still valid and as
relevant, but new vectors like type confusion are exploding. With so many diverse threats to pro-
tect against, software based solutions struggle to meet the requirements of performance while still
being effective.
Furthermore, there is another reason that limits the effectiveness of some software based solu-
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tions — privilege. Most of these solutions operate at the same privilege level, indeed in the same
address space, as the program. Any attacker advanced enough to have the capability to affect the
program, can, hence, affect the security measure as well. Stack canaries, for instance, have been
shown to be easily bypassable via simple brute forcing and/or disclosure of canary value [93].
1.2 Hardware Based Defenses
Due to the above shortcomings of software based defenses, security engineers have started looking
towards hardware for assistance, thus creating a new paradigm for defensive techniques. Doing so,
however, is not as simple as it seems. In order to develop truly secure and practical solutions in
hardware, it behooves us to understand the trade offs and considerations that guide their design.
1.2.1 Why Hardware?
As discussed above, the foremost argument for implementing defenses in hardware is, unsurpris-
ingly, performance. In fact, task-specific special purpose hardware is especially commonplace
nowadays with modern commercial system-on-chips containing multiple accelerators for common
applications like graphics and cryptography. Specialized hardware for a specific task is generally
better than an equivalent software implementation in terms of performance and energy, when the
task has a well-defined data set and is self-contained. The same principle applies for hardware
based defenses as well – if the solution involves operations being performed on clearly disam-
biguated data operands, it might be a good candidate for hardware implementation. Consider,
Softbound [81], a compiler based bounds checking solution aiming to provide spatial memory
safety, which checks the validity of every memory access against the bounds defined in the meta-
data for the pointer being dereferenced. These metadata are, in turn, stored at a known fixed offset
from the pointer. The hardware implementation of the same, Hardbound [36], brings down its
overhead from 79% to only 5%.
Additionally, there is also the advantage of privilege. Since hardware is at the root of all trust in
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the system and has the higher privilege than any piece of software, defenses employed in hardware
are harder to disable, manipulate, and/or bypass1.
One general concern about hardware based solutions, however, is that they are too low-level
and hence, do not observe enough semantic information about the program to effectively detect
anomalous behavior. This does not always have to be the case, especially when the attack involves
a clear violation of architectural principles that reflect common program behavior (e.g., functions
should always return to the instruction after the corresponding call to it). Solutions to more com-
plicated problems have taken the following two approaches so far. Firstly, a hardware-software
co-design has been shown to be very effective wherein the hardware takes hints from software,
either at runtime or through metadata generated through compile-time analyses. Numerous past
works, especially in the area of memory safety, have taken this approach since it was observed in
many cases that identification of linguistic constructs like pointers and data structures completely
in hardware was imprecise and resulted in false positives/negatives [36]. Simple hints/annotations
at the program level, when possible, easily and efficiently mitigated this problem. The second
approach is a more recent one wherein the hardware infers semantic information via microarchi-
tectural events. This usually requires training against a golden model so that malicious behavior is
signaled whenever this expectation is violated. Although the latter technique has only been shown
to be effective for anomaly detection [34], it can potentially be used for detecting more specific
attack scenarios.
1.2.2 But It is No Silver Bullet
With all the benefits of hardware based defenses outlined above, the question we need to ask
ourselves then is, why not implement all or most defenses in hardware? Or more specifically,
where do we draw the line at which point it would make sense to implement a software technique
to hardware? To answer this question, we have to understand the various factors and trade-offs that
1This is a double-edged sword since hardware attacks can also be extremely potent. The recent Spectre, Meltdown,
and Rowhammer [59] attacks are cases to this point.
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hardware vendors have to contend with for a design to make economic sense.
Performance. As fast as specialized hardware can be, they still usually do introduce some
slowdown. As such, engineers have to keep the slowdown figures of the design to a few percentage
points for it to be viable (depending on the context). Unless they are able to achieve this, the feature
will be deemed fairly slow for most practical purposes. It, thus, becomes a trade-off wherein the
vendor has to gauge performance overheads of the feature, how critical that security feature is for
the client’s application, and what portion of the total user base utilize those applications.
Effectiveness. This is a crucial factor especially for security measures, since, unlike other
performance or usability optimizations/extensions, security measures could potentially become
quickly outdated if a new attack vector is discovered. Because hardware is not easily updatable,
users would just be burdened with a useless, or in some extreme cases, harmful hardware feature,
rendering the vendor’s investment in the technology unprofitable. Given major hardware design
iterations take several years to go from conception to commercialization, vendors, thus, need to be
assured of the importance of the problem in question in the years to come, and the effectiveness of
the solution against unpredictable vectors within this period.
Complexity. The complexity of any feature directly correlates to the effort and cost of its
integration in the final product. This is because complex solution can interact with and occasion-
ally need modifications in multiple microarchitectural subsystems, thus raising not only the cost
of development but also that of validation. Since most commercial microprocessors are already
extremely intricate, introducing complex features, security or otherwise, entails an arduous effort,
and does not guarantee that new bugs will not be introduced. Furthermore, complex techniques
often require power hungry structures, thus increasing the energy budget of the chip, especially if
it is an always-on feature.
Longevity. Although hardware is not as immutable as most people imagine2, they are still
highly static compared to the flexibility offered by software. Architectural specifications persist
over multiple processor generations, users continue to use the same hardware for years on end.
2Vendors often release microcode patches to change the functionality of chips on the field.
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Tying back to the long-term effectiveness of the measure, it becomes more critical to determine
whether the technique exhibits a conservative promise to be a significant deterrent for that attack
in the near future. Otherwise, it is hard to justify its inclusion in the final product.
A good hardware solution would, thus, have to assuage all of the above vendor concerns suf-
ficiently and convincingly to make its way into production and sustained usage. Consider Intel
MPX [53] for instance. It was released in commercial Intel Haswell processors in 2015, and fol-
lows the long line of work in the area of bounds checking support in hardware [36, 45, 79, 80].
This approach required fairly non-trivial changes to hardware and software, and consequently, due
to its many issues of compatibility and performance [86], MPX hardly made its way into popular
applications. In fact, support for MPX was recently retired in GCC9. Over the last decade, nu-
merous other hardware security features have been proposed in major architectural, systems, and
security conferences, and yet only a small handful can be seen in current chips. Even accounting
for the fact that, as with other technologies, security ideas need to be improved and cross-validated
over multiple iterations before they can be considered refined enough for commercial release, the
disparity between research and deployment in hardware security implies a lack of cognizance of
the above factors so far.
1.3 Thesis and Contributions
In the light of the above discussion, this dissertation makes the following thesis statement:
Hardware support for software-based defenses can not only complement but also improve their
efficacy and performance, without requiring extensive modifications to core microarchitecture.
To support the above thesis, this dissertation makes the following contributions in the form of
three case studies.
I. Securing Code. There exist two main attack vectors for compromising the integrity of code
and its flow in a program — code injection attacks and code reuse attacks3 [114]. Both of these
3Code pointer corruption might lead to either or both, but we treat it as a data-based attack for this discussion.
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techniques have been documented for over 20 years, but are still relevant today. Although code
injection was largely mitigated as a primary vector with hardware features like the NX bit and
W⊕X, code reuse attacks are still being employed in the wild today. The first contribution of
this dissertation is to re-architect a technique called instruction set randomization (ISR) that is
considered highly effective against code injection attacks but fundamentally vulnerable to code
reuse. In fact with threat models relevant today, even ISR’s effectiveness against code injection
is questionable. By adding some hardware support, we demonstrate for the first time that our
variant of ISR not only prevents code injection attacks under current threat models, but could
also effectively counter state-of-the-art code reuse attacks. We achieve this by encrypting code
with strong cryptographic primitives statically, and decrypting them just before execution, without
adding significant performance overheads. Crucially, as asserted by the thesis of this dissertation,
we show how this can be made possible with modifications to the L1 instruction cache and the
MMU page walker, thus leaving other core substructures and data caches largely in tact. We also
provide a full-system view of this technique highlighting how its protection could be turned on
from the very first instruction executed at boot, and the distribution models that need to be in place
to accommodate a feature like this.
II. Securing Data. Next in the dissertation, we discuss a novel method for securing data
against common types of memory safety violations, which are one of the most long-standing and
critical threats in computer security. While previous solutions in this area were effective, they
required non-trivial changes to hardware, besides other drawbacks. Our technique, however, in-
troduced hardware support for a simple primitive, i.e., comparison against a large, predetermined
random value, and used this primitive to enable practical memory safety in the program with sim-
ple software support. Notably, since our primitive itself is so simple, its hardware support is also
very trivial (just a comparator at minimum). We also demonstrate how our technique introduces
nominal slowdown in the application and is able to provide heap safety even for legacy binaries.
III. Securing the Address Space. The final case study in this dissertation presents a negative
result, wherein we modify the virtual address space to present a randomized sequence of addresses
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to the program instead of the traditional model where addresses follow a linear sequence. This
effectively serves to uniformly randomize of the entire address space at a very fine granularity.
We argue that doing so prevents the attacker from “traversing” from one data structure to another,
thus providing spatial memory safety. It was, however, determined that the implementation and





Before we dive into the case studies, it is useful to understand the general approaches towards
implementation of hardware solutions in order to gain a better insight into the related complexity
and sources of overhead, independent of the goal of the individual technique. Towards that end,
in this chapter, I will broadly classify past and present hardware security solutions that have been
proposed to aid or replace problems traditionally handled by software, and discuss the the nature of
modification necessary to accommodate them in a modern general-purpose microprocessor. This
classification will be based on the type of hardware implementation, rather than the problem it
solves or the effectiveness of different proposals constituting the class. In the subsequent chapters,
a detailed analysis of the related work for relevant topics will be presented. Also, note that there
are other classes of defenses that counter side channel attacks, provide isolation, etc., and so, are
tangentially related to code and data security, but from a hardware or privilege standpoint. Such





































Figure 2.1: Generic baseline architecture and its hardware security mechanisms.
2.1 Baseline Architecture
Prior to discussing various aspects of the cost and benefits associated with particular hardware
defenses and the changes they require, we provide the readers with a baseline architectural design
against which to evaluate hardware solutions, existing or new.
Figure 2.1 shows the baseline architecture that we use for illustrating all the security tech-
niques. The baseline shows a processor and off-chip components: the off-chip components include
DRAM, off-chip compute units which can be GPUs or FPGAs, a TPM and a I/O hub chip which
can connects to various peripherals. Inside the processor, without loss of generality, we assume a
single core processor but we will point out multicore related issues as they are relevant.
The core includes standard microarchitectural structures: the mode bits determine if the core is
in supervisory mode or user mode, the IL1 is the level 1 instruction cache that holds instructions,
the ITLB is the translation lookaside buffer which provides virtual to physical address translation
for instructions, an instruction fetch unit (IFU), a decoder, a register file that has integer and fp reg-
ister, an out-of-order issue and commit unit, and several structures for handling memory accesses.
The structures for handling memory accesses include a level 1 data cache, the load store queue
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(LSQ) which is used to support reordering of memory requests, MMU which includes the data
translation lookaside buffer and different page walking or page walk caching mechanisms. Beyond
the core, we assume a L2 cache that is banked, each bank has tags and data. Our baseline chip
also includes some special purpose on-chip offload engines (such as a graphics core), a memory
controller that reorders and relays request to memory, and I/O controller that relays and manages
requests to I/O devices.
All of these on-chip structures are connected by an on-chip network. This baseline is abstract
and sufficiently representative to provide intuition on cost/complexity of hardware security mech-
anisms.
2.2 Semantic Metadata Based Defenses
This class of defenses associates semantic metadata with each pointer in order to ascertain that it
is never illegitimately dereferenced. This metadata could take the form of addresses, permissions,
and other semantic information regarding the corresponding data structure, and may be stored
along with the pointer or in a separate shadow space that reflects the program’s memory layout.
Works in this category have so far taken one of two forms.
In the first variant, the metadata is used to enforce bounds checking on the pointer at derefer-
ence. Each pointer is functionally associated with a corresponding start address and an end address
(or length) that specifies the bounds of the pointed structure. In some works, temporal information
is also stored that indicates the “version” of the structure, so that if the current structure is deal-
located and another allocated in the same region, a pointer dereference of the old structure can be
caught. The first hardware support for such a scheme was Hardbound [36], which did not enforce
temporal safety. Subsequent works [45, 79, 80] refined this technique to enforce more accurate
spatial and temporal bounds. Notably, Intel launched the MPX ISA extension [53] in 2015 that
brought this technology into a commercial domain.





































Figure 2.2: Hardware modifications for semantic metadata based defenses (highlighted).
access-control and can be loosely defined as tokens necessary to access a particular resource. Con-
ceptually they can be represented as a data structure consisting of a unique resource-identifier and
the associated credential. Privileges are acquired by entities when they receive the appropriate to-
ken. These tokens must be unforgeable and are passed to entities, preferably according to the prin-
ciple of least privileges. Although considered an obsolete technology until recently, CHERI [126]
and its follow-up works [22, 23, 123] have revived it, and demonstrated its viability in a practical
setup.
Hardware Modifications. Although individual proposals have their own unique design points
and optimizations, here we outline common features of a naive design for a typical scheme in
this class. Such system conceptually require wider data-paths and memory elements, and access
checking circuitry on memory accesses to impose rules dictated by the metadata, which have to be
separately accessed. Often techniques provide a separate metadata cache and TLB at the L1, thus
functionally extending the existing caches and TLB, to enable fast lookup of metadata. Notably,
WatchdogLite handles metadata explicitly just like regular data, while CHERI uses a capability
coprocessor a placed next to the pipeline to perform the latter. The hardware units that are affected
are shown in Figure 2.2.
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2.3 Tagged Defenses
This type of defense is similar to the previous class in that they use metadata (often called tags, in
this context), but in this class they are usually just one or a few bits. The tags indicate a state, only
meaningful in the context the defense operates. Depending on the solution, these tags could be se-
mantically attached to memory locations, pointers, and/or data. For instance, some techniques [96,
107, 119] attach tags to memory to validate if can be accessed or not. Some [3, 48] go still further
by attaching tags to pointers as well, to enforce a degree access control by mandating that tags of
pointers and accessed location match.
Amore advanced form of this class of defense is dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) [113].
DIFT uses metadata or taints to track the flow of untrusted information within the system, to make
sure that it does not unexpectedly affect any trusted or secret portion of the system, or otherwise
leak it on untrusted channels. The idea is that if at least one of the operands for an operation is
untrusted, the output is untrusted as well and should be limited in its ability to interact with other
elements of the program. The same goes for all operations involving this output, and so on. De-
pending on how the tags are propagated and checked, what gets tainted, and who monitors them,
DIFT can be used for a variety of purposes from access control to information leakage.
Hardware Modifications. The degree of tagging support is dependent on what is being tagged
and how tags are propagated. Conceptually, the modifications required are similar to the previous
class. To detect flow of data through the processor, the data pathways – memory elements (register
file, microarchitectural registers, and buffers) and buses/interconnection networks – have to be
extended by the tag-width. In practice, however, when the tags are narrow enough, some solutions
have leverage/repurpose ECC bits in main memory for tags [3, 48]. Some current solutions aimed
at 64-bit architectures also use the unused higher order of the address to store pointer tags, thus
significantly lowering the hardware requirements. Depending also on whether the data and tags
can be atomically accessed, one or more memory accesses may be necesssary for each data access.
Additionally, for DIFT, to taint the output of operations involving tainted data, a small OR gate
is necessary around computational units which takes as input the taint statuses of the inputs, and
16
marks the output tainted if any of the inputs are tainted. Since both classes are based on per
memory metadata, the hardware modifications for this class are similar to that of the previous class
shown in Figure 2.2.
2.4 Cryptographic Defenses
Although cryptography has been a popularly used mechanism for data integrity and secrecy, there
have only been a handful proposals that utilize it to protect code and data at the process abstraction
level. Hence I will give a brief overview of some notable techniques individually below.
ASIST [88] is the first hardware scheme proposed to support ISR (discussed in more detail
in chapter 3). Essentially, it encrypts program code with simple XOR or bit transposition. This
is done at runtime with a simple key, programmable into a register, which decrypts instructions
just before they are stored in the L1 instruction cache. Polyglot [104] operates similarly except
it uses stronger AES encryption, besides asymmetrically encrypting the code encryption keys as
well. Details of these technique are discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
Recently, a similar randomization technique, called HARD [8] for data was proposed that stat-
ically determined equivalence classes of data based on the instruction they were accessed from.
These classes were then XOR-encrypted with the same key and the key associated with the in-
struction(s). Recently, ARM also announced a pointer authentication technology [97], wherein all
pointers can be encrypted with a master key and authenticated at dereference. This is to counter
out-of-band corruption or forging of original pointers, for instance, through an overflow of a buffer
into a neighboring pointer variable.
Hardware Modifications. The techniques outlined above have completely different purposes
and hence do not share any common design features except the addition of a decrypting unit. For
ASIST and Polyglot, this unit is added at the memory facing interface of the L1 instruction cache
and is just a XOR or a large decoder structure. In case of ARM pointer authentication, although
design details have not been disclosed publicly, a naive design would introduce an encryption and
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decryption engine in the pipeline as an additional functional unit. HARD also adds caches around
the pipeline and decryption units. Overall, above techniques introduce small overheads on the
baseline architecture depending on the specific cryptographic algorithm used and where in the data
path the operations occur.
2.5 Logging or Monitoring Based Defenses
Many novel ideas have lately been proposed that leverage microarchitectural logs present in mod-
ern microprocessors (hardware performance counters, branch direction stores, etc.) to detect at-
tacks or otherwise anomalous program execution. One of the challenges of utilizing hardware logs
is the fact that they may not capture enough information about the execution software, be it the OS
or individual programs on it, so much so that any kind of semantic information about the past or
present state of execution may not be discernible. To illustrate through a naive example, could one
be able to detect that a buffer overflow attack has occurred just by looking at the cache-miss coun-
ters? Luckily, modern microprocessors usually maintain a host of different counters or records that
have been shown to reflect program behavior fairly well [102]. Depending on the complexity of
information sought, some form of heuristic post-processing of these data may be required though,
thus requiring an offline software component (running on a separate core, for instance) to process
the data and raise the alarm when necessary.
Hardware Modifications. Usually these solutions require very little hardware modifications,
since the bulk of the logs are already present in the microarchitecture. Synthesizing this informa-
tion may however require a small hardware component (in SCRAP [55], for instance), unless this
task is offloaded to software [34, 87].
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CHAPTER 3
Reviving Instruction Set Randomization with Polyglot
Instruction set randomization (ISR) was originally proposed as a countermeasure against code in-
jection attacks. However, it is largely considered to have lost its relevance due to the pervasiveness
of code-reuse techniques in modern attacks, against which ISR is fundamentally ineffective. Ad-
ditoinally, code injection no longer remains a foundational component in contemporary exploits.
This chapter revisits the relevance of ISR in the current security landscape. We show that
prior ISR schemes are ineffective against code injection, but can be made effective against code-
reuse attacks, and even counter state-of-the-art variants, such as “just-in-time” ROP (JIT-ROP).
Yet, certain key architectural features are necessary for enabling these capabilities. We implement
a new ISR system, namely Polyglot, on a SPARC32-based Leon3 FPGA that runs Linux. We
show that our system incurs a low performance overhead (4.6% on a subset of SPEC CINT2006)
and defends against real-world (JIT-)ROP exploits, while still supporting critical features like page
sharing. Polyglot is also the first ISR implementation to be applicable to the entire software stack:
from the bootloader to user applications.
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3.1 Introduction
Instruction set randomization (ISR) was proposed as a way of mitigating code injection attacks [7,
56]. Specifically, ISR involves randomizing the underlying instruction-set architecture (ISA) of a
CPU, thereby giving the appearance of a unique instruction set to every program. For instance,
the opcode 0xa may denote XOR on one machine, but may be invalid on another. This prevents
an unauthorized party (attacker) from using the same exploit on multiple targets—any injected
(shell)code must adhere to the unique ISA used by the vulnerable program to be effective.
ISR implementations typically “emulate” the random ISA using a layer of encryption. Code
is encrypted at the binary level and decrypted on-memory, right before execution. Apart from
ASIST [88], the only hardware-based ISR scheme to date, all previous solutions [7, 16, 51, 56, 95]
are software-based and primarily utilize dynamic binary instrumentation frameworks, like Pin [71].
This method for generating diversity is far simpler than customizing the decoder on each chip to
implement random instruction mappings or changing the microarchitecture of every CPU instance.
However, ISR has a major drawback that impedes its widespread adoption—it is completely
ineffective against code-reuse attacks, which is the typical cornerstone of modern exploits [21, 89,
90, 101]. This is because code-reuse attacks, as the term implies, stitch together legitimate code
pieces, already present in the address space of a running process. Additionally, as we show later,
once an attacker has the means to overcome techniques like W⊕X, ISR can be trivially bypassed
as well. Hence, even as a defense against code injection, ISR is no more effective than other
established techniques.
Aside from this fundamental limitation, all the previously-proposed ISR schemes also suffer
from one, or more, of the following major issues:
1 Unfavorable performance–security trade-offs. Since instructions are decrypted at runtime,
the decryption process falls squarely in the critical path of instruction execution and the associated
latency is hard to amortize. Hence, weak encryption schemes are traditionally used to offset this
overhead, resulting in new attacks [109, 124].
2 No self-protection. Since most previous solutions are software-based, they: (a) expose a
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Figure 3.1: High-level overview of Polyglot.
large trusted computing base (TCB), and (b) can be turned off easily, because the enabling frame-
work executes at the same privilege level with the protected application(s).
3 Incongruent with modern software systems. Previous schemes provide limited or no support
for shared libraries and page sharing. Hence, they are impractical in modern settings, as they incur
large memory overheads [6].
4 Archaic threat model. Previous approaches do not consider memory disclosure vulnerabil-
ities as part of their threat model. Yet, arbitrary memory reads are a standard component in recent
work in the area [5, 29, 33, 46, 106], and quite popular to present-day attacks.
In this work, we propose Polyglot, a hardware-based ISR scheme that concurrently addresses
all the above concerns. Polyglot not only improves significantly the traditional security properties
of ISR, but also counters state-of-the-art code-reuse attacks, which are a novel and more relevant
target for this technique. We utilize strong encryption (AES [110] and ECC), successfully over-
coming the challenges of impractical performance by removing decryption from the critical path
with microarchitectural optimizations. We present two schemes: (a) one with no overhead in prac-
tical systems, catering to the standard threat model used in anti code-reuse-attacks proposals; and
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(b) another with nominal overhead to counter a stronger threat model. Unlike most prior work, we
encrypt at the page, instead of application, granularity. This not only enables richer diversifica-
tion, but also allows us to trivially support page sharing and seamlessly apply ISR to the system
software (OS, hypervisor, etc.). We are also the first to show how ISR functionality can be logi-
cally extended to operate from system boot time, when the memory management unit (MMU), and
hence paging, is disabled. Consequently, our implementation of ISR is available from the very first
instruction that the system executes.
Figure 3.1 provides an overview of Polyglot. Binaries are encrypted page-wise with AES,
while upon execution, the hardware memory controller (with the help of the OS) decrypts the
executing instructions as they are transferred into the cache, so that the program remains encrypted
in memory. We elaborate on the rationale and motivation of such a design in next section.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
• We propose Polyglot, a hardware-assisted ISR implementation, and demonstrate for the first
time that it can be used as a defense not only against code injection, but also against (static
or dynamic) code-reuse attacks (CRAs) that are a more critical extant threat. In addition, we
show how prior proposals fail to fit into this role.
• We overcome the security-performance tradeoffs exhibited by previous ISR proposals, and
illustrate how Polyglot can be performant despite using strong cryptographic schemes.
• We uphold the principles of scalable software design by supporting shared libraries and page
sharing.
• We implement a SPARC32-based prototype, based on the Leon3 open-source SoC pack-
age [66], which allows us to study and demonstrate the full-system viability of our proposal.
This enables us to practically evaluate the system from a performance and security stand-
point.
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3.2 Background and Motivation
In this section, we give a brief overview of previous work on ISR, and claim that in the face of
modern exploitation techniques, ISR is completely ineffective. Subsequently, we motivate a novel
way in which ISR can become valuable again, when combined with other protection mechanisms,
albeit only if strong encryption is employed.


















Barrantes et al. [7] ✗ XOR Proc. ✗ ✗ ✗ App. High
Kc et al. [56] ✗ XOR Proc. ✗ ✗ ✗ App. High
Hu et al. [51] ✗ AES Proc. ✗ ✗ ✗ App. High
Boyd et al. [16] ✗ XOR Proc. ✗ ✗ ✗ App. Med.























Table 3.1: Comparison of various ISR proposals. (∗Shared library support does not necessarily
imply sharing them across processes, unless code sharing is allowed.)
Most prior ISR attempts are software based (see Table 3.1), and typically implement random-
ization using dynamic binary instrumentation tools, such as Pin [71], or platform emulators, like
Bochs [64]. Obviously, an attacker can turn off, or subvert, such components as they execute at
the same privilege level as the protected application. Apart from other practicality issues, they also
exhibit significant slowdowns [95] and were demonstrated to be bypassable [109, 124], due to their
use of weak XOR-based encryption.
ASIST [88] sidesteps problems with performance and (the lack of support for) shared libraries
by providing hardware support for ISR, and incorporates the best practices of most of the previous
techniques. ASIST allows two types of weak encryption: XOR and transposition. The encryption
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keys are unique to every process, and can be generated either at compile time, in which case the
application statically links with all its dependencies, or at load time, where the pages are encrypted
dynamically. The latter mode allows shared libraries, but does not allow sharing them between
applications, thus incurring a significant (memory) overhead [6]. Absence of page sharing also
precludes the copy-on-write primitive, significantly increasing the overhead of fork.
3.2.2 ISR against Code-Reuse Attacks
Code-reuse techniques are the attackers’ response to the increased adoption of hardening mech-
anisms, like non-executable memory (NX), in commodity systems. The main idea behind code-
reuse is to construct the malicious payload by reusing instructions already present in the address
space of a vulnerable process [101]. This powerful technique gives the attacker the same level
of flexibility offered by arbitrary code injection, without injecting any new code at all; the mali-
cious payload consists of just a sequence of gadget addresses intermixed with any necessary data
arguments.
ISR is fundamentally ineffective against code-reuse attacks (CRAs), since attackers can con-
struct their payload without knowing how the instructions have been scrambled. One only needs
to know the location of the appropriate gadgets.
In the presence of various code-randomization schemes [63], state-of-the-art CRAs have been
evolved to discover gadgets dynamically, at runtime, by scanning code pages [106]. To prevent
this, two conditions have to be met:
1 The host binary should differ from the attacker’s copy.
2 Code should not be readable.
These two conditions are sufficient, as an attacker can neither scan binaries at the host, nor use
their own copy in conjunction with the diversified copy to mount a CRA. (Note that this does not
rule out data-only attacks [19].)
To this end, we propose combining ISR with a fine-grained (code) randomization scheme to
thwart state-of-the-art CRAs. While the latter satisfies condition 1 an ideal ISR implementation
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can also indirectly prevent condition 2 by revealing (ideally irreversible) encrypted text when
code is read.
However, if ISR, plus diversification, is all that is needed, can we just combine code random-
ization with any of the previous ISR proposals? In other words, can we use ISR based on weak
encryption to fulfill the above conditions? Unfortunately, encryption schemes such as XOR and
bit transposition can be easily bypassed, even under the presence of fine-grained diversification;
during our preliminary experiments we were able to leak keys for the two schemes easily, using
entirely architecture- and ABI-independent methods (we elaborate more in Section 3.6.1). Hence,
we argue that using stronger encryption, at low cost, is pivotal in providing effective ISR-based
protection.
3.3 Adversarial Model
We assume that the chip manufacturer is trusted and the attacker is incapable of physically probing
the contents of the chip. We also assume that the processor supports some form of W⊕X mecha-
nism (e.g., NX bit). In addition, the OS and the essential system components are otherwise trusted
to perform their duties faithfully. Note that side-channel attacks are considered out of scope. We
present two versions of Polyglot in this work, which are geared towards two adversarial models.
• Adversarial Model A. Under this model, the adversary has access to the source code and/or
a non-randomized version of the target program. She is aware of memory corruption bugs in it
that can be exploited to gain arbitrary read and write capabilities. The same applies in the kernel
setting, but the MMU-related structures are assumed to be protected with existing defenses [32,
122]. Lastly, the attacker also has the ability to carry out a finite number of brute force attacks
before being detected. In this scenario, the first variant of Polyglot, namely Polyglot-A, seeks to
protect against runtime code-reuse attacks.
This model is identical to previous studies regarding runtime CRAs [29, 46, 106], both offen-
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sive and defensive, with the additional extension to the kernel.
• Adversarial Model B. Under this model, the adversary does not have access to the source
code, but is more capable: she can subvert the OS, including the MMU structures, can access the
randomized binary, and has physical access to the system allowing her to snoop/probe the buses,
memory, and system peripherals other than the processor internals. In other words, we consider
the processor to be the only component in our TCB.
This model clearly goes beyond CRAs and targets (static and dynamic) code leaks in general.
In this case, Polyglot-B tries to prevent theft of application keys, and hence, plaintext code.
3.4 System Architecture
In this section, we present Polyglot’s architectural design, detailing our software and hardware
modifications, and how they inter-operate to achieve our goals.
3.4.1 Software
Binary Generation. To create an “ISRized” binary, we symmetrically encrypt a diversified ver-
sion of it, at page granularity, with randomly generated keys. (Note that only executable sections
are encrypted.) These key-to-address mappings are then asymmetrically encrypted using the target
processor’s public key and packaged into the binary itself. Since code is encrypted at a page gran-
ularity, the executable, and its required shared libraries, possibly encrypted by different sources,
are able to interoperate. Additionally, asymmetric encryption ties the binaries to their respective
hosts.
Binary Execution. The dynamic loader and the OS are responsible for extracting the encrypted
keys from ISRized binaries. In particular, the OS is in charge of them, during its execution lifetime,
and for setting up the process’ page tables, as well as its own, in a format expected by the hardware.
(Note that our scheme allows code pages to exist in plaintext if necessary.) Additionally, since we

























Figure 3.2: Modifications to page table. We use a reserved field in page-table value type field to
indicate a subsequent ISR PTE. The ISR PTE here corresponds to a page shared between Processes
A and B. PTD indicates a page table descriptor, which is a pointer to the next level, whereas PTE
is the final translation.
readily supported, i.e., by using the same translation entry among the page tables of processes that
share a particular page (see Figure 3.2).
Supporting ISR at the kernel level is achieved simply by changing the kernel’s own page map-
ping(s) to an ISR-PTE version. Overall, our modifications added ∼1100 LOC to the Linux kernel
(v3.8.1). Since paging is disabled at system boot, we randomize the bootloader by encrypting the
whole image according to its layout in physical memory, so that encrypted execution is enabled
from the very first instruction. Care is taken, however, to ensure that when the MMU is turned on,
and paging enabled, the respective keys match (i.e., before and after enabling virtual addressing).
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3.4.2 Hardware
All previous ISR implementations suffer either from prohibitive slowdowns, weak security, or
both. Polyglot however aims to overcome both, and proper hardware support plays a crucial role
in this.
Given our threat model, we face quite a few challenges. Firstly, because the attacker can read
and modify program memory and can probe system buses, we can allow decryption only inside
the processor. But symmetric decryption has non-trivial latency. Adding it to the instruction-
fetch critical path is not practical. In the same vein, the keys themselves cannot be stored in
memory in plaintext and so, have to be decrypted inside the processor. Asymmetric decryption,
however, has orders of magnitude higher latency than symmetric decryption. The main design
challenge is thus to absorb or amortize these overheads as much as possible. Furthermore, secure
key management being a key component of any encryption scheme, has to be considered at every
step of the full-system design. For Polyglot-B, since our TCB is just the processor, we want code
and keys to be encrypted at all times while outside the chip. Furthermore, it is preferable that these
challenges be addressed with minimal changes in and as simple extensions of already-prevalent
system architecture design. In our implementation, modifications mostly occur in the instruction
page fault and instruction cache miss pathway.
Instruction Page Fault.
First we explain the basic changes required to enable the simpler version of Polyglot that does
not require key-encryption, and then describe simple additions to this framework to support key-
encryption.
Since keys are associated with every code page, it is convenient to fetch keys for a particular
page while processing the corresponding fault. To do so, we require that last-level PTEs contain
the translation as well as the associated key for code pages. The ISR PTE, thus, consists of the
actual translation followed by the key for the page. To denote an ISR PTE we use a reserved value













Figure 3.3: ISR page fault handling flowchart.
An interesting design challenge now is that since ISR PTEs are longer than a word and do
not otherwise conform to a power-of-two alignment, the traditional method of offset-based PTE
fetching does not work. We solved this by extending the original page walk scheme by one more
level of indirection. Instead of storing the physical address of another table to offset into, we store
the physical address of the ISR PTE entry itself at the penultimate level. This design allows the
OS to arrange these entries in whichever way it deems convenient – either as a contiguous table,
or as discrete entries in memory. The hardware page-walk scheme is agnostic to this organization.
On a page fault, the origin of the fault (DTLB or ITLB) determines whether a code or data
page is expected, and fault-handling is done appropriately (as shown in Figure 3.3). If the fault is
on a code page, the table walk proceeds as usual until an entry with the ISR type is encountered.
This indicates to the MMU that the next level is an ISR PTE. The walk mechanism procures the
key and translation from the physical address found at this level and stored in the ITLB. A normal
PTE for a code page fault indicates an unencrypted page. If an invalid entry is found during the
walk instead, the page fault handler in the OS is invoked as usual. The OS is then responsible for
setting up the tables in a manner expected by the hardware.
On the other hand, if an ISR page is encountered on a data page walk, the key is ignored and































































Figure 3.4: Hardware decryption scheme in Polyglot. On a page fault (left half), ISR PTE contents
are brought into the ITLB. On a cache miss (right half), a cache line is decrypted using the page
key before dropping into I-cache.
to exist in the same page—code accesses to an ISRized page fetch and use the decryption key to
decrypt code, while data accesses to the same page will fetch contents as is. This means that code
can be treated as data, i.e., can be read and written to. However to allow correct decryption, data
and code must either be aligned at cache block width, or, if they exist within the same line, ensure
that the data is immutable. This can be done either by the compiler or the user.
An extra level of walk is added to the original mechanism when an ISR PTE is encountered.
On encountering it, the hardware uses the the entry as the pointer to the actual translation, and
fetches the ISR PTE from that address. The ITLB was modified to hold an additional key-field for
each entry. If no ISR entries are found, the walk procedure continues as before.
An overview of how execution proceeds in hardware is shown in Figure 3.4. On encountering a
fault to a code page (step 1 ), the MMUwalks the page table and finds the corresponding ISR PTE
consisting of the translation and the asymmetrically-encrypted key. At this point, it sequentially
fetches the actual translation (step 2 ) as well as the the key and is deposited into the ITLB. Here
onwards, any i-cache miss originating from this page is decrypted with this key (step 4 ), before
being stored in the I-cache. As long as this instruction is not evicted, execution uses the decrypted
instruction.
Enabling Key-encryption for Polyglot-B. Doing so requires one additional change in the scheme
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described above. We require that each processor have an asymmetric key-pair associated with it.
While the public portion of it can be revealed, the private portion never leaves the chip.
In this case, the keys in the ISR-PTEs are asymmetrically encrypted with the processor’s public
key. The only change now would be made in the ISR-PTE fetching step during a page-walk (step
2 in the figure). Instead of directly depositing the key in ITLB, it is decrypted first according to
the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encrypted Scheme (ECIES) [72]. We ignore the key authentication
portion of the standard however.
We added the requisite ECC-162 and SHA-256 accelerators to the MMU, where they perform
key decryption. However, we have now inserted asymmetric decryption into the critical path of
code-page fault resolution, thus adding a non-trivial latency to it. We rely on the fact that code
page faults are not common. We see in our evaluations that this assumption is true for most parts
and the performance hit is largely unnoticeable.
Furthermore, since our scheme is easily integrated with page-walking, we make a simple and
inexpensive extension in our design to provide encryption at two other, non-page granularities
as well. In typical page-tables, the level determines the memory region covered by the PTE. In
SPARC32 specifications, a level-3 PTE covers 4kB, level-2 covers 256kB, while level-1 covers
16MB. Our simple optimization, allows a single key to be associated with these memory granu-
larities depending on which level the PTE exists at. This is useful in mapping large regions of
code, without using up a lot of space for keys. We found this particularly useful while mapping the
kernel’s own page tables, especially when set up by the bootloader.
Instruction Cache Miss.
On an I-cache miss, as instructions are fetched from memory, they are decrypted and stored in
plaintext in the I-cache. D-cache miss handling remains unaltered. The challenge however is
that although symmetric decryption is much faster than asymmetric decryption, instruction fetches
are fairly more common. Adding decryption latency to the critical path will cause impractical
performance overheads. This is the main reason prior work opt for inexpensive encryption like
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XOR or bit-transposition.
To overcome this, we use symmetric encryption in counter mode [40]. In this mode, the actual
decryption is performed on a counter value, which is then (traditionally) XOR’ed with the actual
data to obtain plaintext. Given the fact that XOR is a cheap operation, if we could determine
the appropriate counter value when the miss is encountered and start decrypting early, instruction
fetch and decryption could proceed in parallel. Moreover, if fetch latency is greater than decryption
latency, no performance overhead would be observable.
The counter itself need not be secret as long as they are not repeated for the same key. We
obtain the counter from the lower bits of memory address (see Figure 3.6). Essentially the counter
equals the block offset into the page. Notably, since the counter can be determined from the address
itself, decryption and fetch request dispatch commence simultaneously. We are able to absorb the
decryption latency in this manner.
The Leon3 SPARC32 implementation only has a single level of split caches. Hence we place
the AES decryptor at the I-cache/memory interface. In our prototype, since the cache line itself
is 32B long while an AES block is 16B, we divide the line into two chunks and decrypt them
simultaneously with two separate counter values trivially derivable from the address. A naive way
of implementing this process would be to fetch the whole line and decrypt it all at once, thus
nullifying two important fetch optimizations. The first of these optimizations streams words into
the core as well as the cache as they are fetched instead of delaying the stream until the entire line
has arrived. The second optimization starts fetching from the requested portion of the line, which
may not necessarily be the first word of it. With counter-mode encryption, we are able to maintain
both optimizations. We do so by XOR’ing the decrypted data with the blocks as they stream from
memory.
Modern systems, however, have many levels of unified cache. In such systems, we propose that
the decryptor be placed between the lowest-level cache (LLC) and memory for energy and perfor-
mance reasons. However since we only want to decrypt code, we will have to track the source
of the miss all the way to this level, and selectively decrypt replies bound for the I-cache. With
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this scheme instructions are decrypted before being filled into the LLC, and remain decrypted in
the lower levels where most of the accesses hit. Most importantly, since in these systems, mem-
ory latency is much higher than symmetric decryption latency, decryption cost can be completely
hidden. Thus symmetric decryption incurs near-zero performance hit, depending on the implemen-
tation and operational factors (bandwidth, pipelining, placement on chip, etc.). This is significant
especially for Polyglot-A since symmetric decryption latency is the only source of overhead here.
Low-level Shared Caches. Pushing decryption beyond the L1 creates a security vulnerability.
Assuming a shared L2, say a cache block was fetched from DRAM into the L2 in response to
a data load request. Now if this data is also requested by the L1-I, the block, which came in as
data without going through the decrypting process, will be fed as is to the L1-I, thus completely
bypassing ISR. An attack vector to exploit this might involve first loading the shell-code, crafted
in native ISA, as data, and referencing the same locations for execution soon thereafter while they
are still in L2. Conversely, consider the case when a code block in L2 is eventually requested by
the L1-D. In such a scenario, a well-crafted attack can read off decrypted instructions just after
they are executed.
We prevent this by tracking instruction and data blocks in all shared caches, by adding a bit
to each cache block indicating whether it is instruction or data. This bit is set by tracking the
source of the miss, i.e., the instruction or the data cache. Cross-sharing between the split caches
is then forbidden, either directly or through L2. If L2 receives a request from the L1-I for a block
marked data, that block has to be flushed to memory and fetched again, this time going through the
decryption process. Similarly, when a block marked instruction is requested as data, it is flushed
and fetched again; only now the decryption module will be bypassed.
MMU-less Execution.
The above design changes deal with the common case of an active MMU, when paging is on. Since
we want ISR support on at all times, we have to support encrypted execution from the very first
instruction executed on boot-up. In this situation, the process is almost the same except the key is
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acquired not from a PTE but directly from a memory location specified by the user. Design-wise,
during this phase, the I-cache changes still remains in play, while the page-walk modifications are
disabled.
Portability to Other Architectures.
Although our implementation employs some SPARC-specific optimizations (e.g., page-level based
encryption granularity), the fundamental ideas are portable across architectures. Even a fixed-
width architecture is not necessary—the same principles apply if an instruction is broken down
over two cache lines. However, we do need a way of denoting ISR pages in the PTE1, as well as
an extra tag bit in the I-cache. Most critically, we make or require no changes to the processor core
architecture.
Importantly, by completely separating the set of ISR changes within the cache and MMUmod-
ules, we keep the core-cache interface intact. Thus, our mechanism is oblivious to complex core
mechanics like super-scalar, branch-prediction, SMT, etc. We foresee these mechanisms to help
our cause by hiding the memory latency associated with code decryption.
As far as software is concerned, the only changes we made that are SPARC-specific is during
the booting process of the kernel and bootloader. We see no reason to believe the same should be
impossible to port in other architectures.
3.4.3 Design Choice Implications
Encryption Algorithms. We use ECC, instead of RSA (i.e., the more popular asymmetric ci-
pher), since ECC has shorter key lengths and encryption/decryption latencies. Furthermore, the
use of counter mode block encryption guarantees that the encrypted code is position dependent
and prevents splicing attacks (i.e., copying encrypted code and reusing it elsewhere).
Page Table. Page-level (encryption) granularity implies that brute-forcing, or careful dictionary-
like attacks on a particular page, reveals nothing about the rest of the system.
1x86 extended page-table (EPT) format has unused mappings [52].
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Allowing Data Accesses to ISR Pages. Previously-proposed systems that seek to disallow run-
time code-scanning make code pages execute-only. We could easily achieve the same by faulting
whenever data page walks encounter an ISR PTE. However, this requires strict segregation be-
tween code and data at the page granularity. Although a more secure option, we considered this
approach limiting in terms of convenience of development, deployability, and practicality.
Syscall Interface. Our mmap variant is used by user applications to map encrypted pages into
a process. This is a weak link as it can be exploited by an attacker. Additionally, the original
mmap is still allowed to load unencrypted code. While the former allowance was indispensable
from a practicality standpoint, the latter was necessary for the sake of convenience; variants of
our architecture can forbid it. Note that introducing this system call does not make Polyglot more
vulnerable to the attack against ASIST that we outlined earlier.
Key Handling. This is one of the most crucial aspects of any crypto-system design. In Polyglot,
the symmetric keys are included in the binary. Since these keys are asymmetrically encrypted,
Polyglot is safe even against binary code leaks, when an attacker obtains the binary itself or the OS
is adversarial2. Another implicit assumption is that the private key, specific to a chip, is irretrievable
by the attacker. In extreme cases, where the physical tampering of the chip is a concern, the private
key could be based on a physically unclonable function [44] that is automatically destroyed if
anyone tries to tamper with it.
3.5 Implementation Details
The goal of developing the prototype is to provide a platform for full system bring-up as well as
to understand its impacts in the context of fully fleshed out microarchitecture. To this end, we
implemented Polyglot in accordance with the design principles described in the previous section.
In this section, we provide the specific implementation details of the same.



































Figure 3.5: ISR binary generation for ELF binaries. Code pages are symmetrically encrypted.
Subsequently the symmetric keys are themselves asymmetrically encrypted with the target sys-
tem’s public key, and embedded within a new section of the ELF binary.
3.5.1 Software
Binary-Creation. We modified objcopy to perform binary encryption – it takes a modified ELF
binary as an input, and encrypts the binary page-wise with AES-128 and adds the key-to-address
mappings to the .isr_map section as discussed before (Figure 3.5). When key encryption is
requested, we use ECC-162 and SHA-256 for encryption according to the ECIES protocol. For
our implementation, encryption is automated and we did not have to change the source code of
any program to accommodate it. The loader is modified to parse the new ELF section and use the
mmap variant to communicate the key ranges while loading shared libraries.
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Kernel. We had to modify the ELF binary-parsing and virtual memory modules of the kernel to
support Polyglot. This involved extracting the key-range mappings from the ELF file, and setting
up the page tables for the process appropriately. Other modifications included changing page-fault
mechanism, allowing proper page-sharing (in the case of forks and shared-libraries), and process
tear-down.
Randomizing the kernel itself required two changes. Firstly, we had to change the kernel’s
own page-mapping to an ISR-PTE version. In SPARC, the level at which a PTE is found in
the page-table dictates the memory coverage of that mapping (more details in the next section).
Consequentially, the Linux kernel just uses one entry in the first level of the page-table with a
coverage of 16MiB. We just changed this to an ISR-PTE of the format described before. Secondly,
the SPARC/Linux does some code-patching during boot according to the exact processor version
it detects. We modified these portions and hard-coded the proper versions for our hardware, so as
to remove all runtime code-patching.
Overall, our modifications added about 1100 LOC to Linux kernel version 3.8.1.
Bootloader. We use mklinuximg-2.6.36 package [78] as the bootloader. Overall, it boots
with the MMU disabled and is responsible for assessing the runtime hardware, copying a portion
of itself that persists after the kernel has booted, and then loading the kernel itself. To enable ISR
on the bootloader, we encrypt as usual and modify the kernel’s and its own page-mappings.
3.5.2 Hardware
We implement our prototype on the 32-bit SPARC-based Leon3 SoC package [66]. Our main
hardware changes involves modifying the page-walk and the instruction-miss mechanisms. For
the two variants of Polyglot, the only difference is the presence of an asymmetric unit in the page
translation fetching pathway.
Page-walk. An extra level of walk is added to the original mechanism when an ISR PTE is
encountered. To denote an ISR PTE we use a reserved value in the type field of a page-table value
as shown in Figure 3.2. When this is encountered, the hardware uses the rest of the entry as the
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pointer for the actual translation, and fetches the ISR PTE from that address. The ITLB was mod-
ified to hold an additional key-field for each entry. If no ISR entries are found, the walk procedure
continues as before. Another important optimization was to modify the memory controller to sat-
isfy ISR requests in burst mode instead of the original configuration of exclusively fetching one
word from memory at a time.
For asymmetric decryption, the processor’s private key is used in accordance with the ECIES
protocol to derive the symmetric key as shown in Figure 3.6, and complements the binary en-
cryption process described before. We added the requisite ECC-162 and SHA-256 accelerators
to the MMU, where they perform key decryption in accordance to the protocol. The accelerators
themselves were not optimized for this particular operating scenario.
Furthermore, since our scheme is easily integrated with page-walking, we make a simple and
inexpensive extension in our design to provide encryption at two other, non-page granularities
as well. In typical page-tables, the level determines the memory region covered by the PTE. In
SPARC32 specifications, a level-3 PTE covers 4kB, level-2 covers 256kB, while level-1 covers
16MB. Our simple optimization, allows a single key to be associated with these memory granu-
larities depending on which level the PTE exists at. This is useful in mapping large regions of
code, without using up a lot of space for keys. We found this particularly useful while mapping the
kernel’s own page tables, especially when set up by the bootloader.
Instruction-fetch. The Leon3 SPARC32 implementation only has a single level of split caches
(L1-I and L1-D). Hence we place the AES decryptor at the I-cache/memory interface. Furthermore,
we also did not need to implement the shared cache modifications proposed in the previous section.
For symmetric encryption, we use AES-128 to decrypt the fetched cache-line. In our proto-
type, since the cache line itself is 32B long, we divide the line into two chunks and decrypt them
simultaneously with two separate counter values. A naive way of implementing this process would
be to fetch the whole line and decrypt it all at once, thus nullifying two important fetch optimiza-
tions. The first of these optimizations streams words into the core as well as the cache as they are



































Figure 3.6: Encryption and decryption in the ECIES scheme. Letters in caps indicate points in
the Gaussian space which have consist of x- and y- coordinates. Base point, G, is specified by the
standards.
starts fetching from the requested portion of the line, which may not necessarily be the first word
of it. With counter-mode encryption, we are able to maintain both optimizations.
Since the counter can be determined from the address itself, decryption and fetch request dis-
patch commence simultaneously. To accommodate the optimizations described above, correspond-
ing block of the encoded cipher is XOR’ed as words are streamed from memory.
Importantly, our modifications to the I-cache involved changing its state machine in a manner
that did not affect its interface with the pipeline. Thus, by completely containing the complete
set of ISR changes within the cache-MMU modules and keeping transparent to the pipeline, we
managed to keep the execution engine in tact.
• Portability to Other Architectures. Although our implementation employs some SPARC-
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specific optimizations (e.g., page-level based encryption granularity), the fundamental ideas are
portable across architectures. Even a fixed-width architecture is not necessary – the same principles
apply if an instruction is broken down over two cache lines. However, we do need a way of
denoting ISR pages in the PTE3, as well as an extra tag bit in the I-cache. Most critically, we make
or require no changes to the processor core architecture.
As far as software is concerned, the only changes we made that are SPARC-specific is during
the booting process of the kernel and bootloader. We see no reason to believe the same should be
impossible to port in other architectures.
3.6 Security Analysis
Evaluating novel defenses is non-trivial since it changes the basic assumptions for prior attacks
thus rendering them ineffective. However, this does not necessarily guarantee its security. More-
over, practical implementations of conceptually secure principles may expose vulnerable inter-
faces. Here, we examine the rationale behind Polyglot’s design decisions and discuss their effec-
tiveness from a security standpoint.
3.6.1 Motivating Strong Encryption
To demonstrate the fact that strong encryption is critically essential, we try to extract the XOR- and
transposition- randomization key from a diversified SPARC binary. We use ASIST’s encryption
parameters as the standard for this analysis.
Our setup is as follows. We use uClibc-0.9.33.2 [118] for SPARC32 as the base binary, which
has 1025 functions comprising about 300kB of code. We assume that program bugs allow arbitrary
memory reads and that locations of some functions can be leaked through memory disclosures.
The plaintext, non-randomized binary is also considered to be available. We emulate three popular
randomization schemes – function and basic-block permutation, and instruction replacement/in-
3x86 extended page-table (EPT) fomat has unused mappings [52].
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sertion. For the latter, we replace/insert instructions aggressively with a probability of 25%. Note
that this is not an actual attack, only a feasibility study to quantify the hardness of successfully
attacking such systems. We, therefore, purposefully keep our approaches generic by not using any
architecture-specific factors and examine the number of functions to be leaked before we can ex-
tract the key. Here, we present the fundamental insights for breaking each scheme and the results.
The detailed pseudocode of the algorithms used to carry out the following attacks are listed in
Appendix 6.1.
Attacking XOR. The main insight we use to break this scheme is that XOR’ing two values, en-
crypted with the same key, yields the same result as XOR’ing the two corresponding plaintext
values: (a ⊕ key) ⊕ (b ⊕ key) = a ⊕ (key ⊕ key) ⊕ b = a ⊕ b. Additionally, we note that for
128b XOR, every fourth word uses the same key-chunk. By exploiting these points, we needed
to examine an average of 5 functions over 100 separately randomized versions of this binary to
discover the key.
Attacking Bit-transposition. Even though key-guessing is theoretically easier for bit-transposition
than it is for XOR (32! choices for the former as opposed to 2128 for the latter), we found that break-
ing transposition was more complicated in the presence of diversification.
For transposition, correctly identifying the plaintext-ciphertext instructions pair is key, which
is hard when code is diversified. The main insight in breaking transposition is that randomiza-
tion occurs at an instruction granularity. An instruction will, therefore, have the same cipher form
regardless of its surrounding instructions or location. Our approach then was to do a frequency
analysis of instructions to find possible plaintext-ciphertext pairs. This would have been straight-
forward had we not used instruction replacement/insertion as one of the randomization schemes.
Using the above approach, we needed to examine an average of 51 functions over 100 separately
randomized versions of the test binary to guess the key.
Take-aways. Clearly, diversification schemes can be adapted to make these attacks harder. How-
ever, any practical attack would certainly be more sophisticated, utilizing not only architectural
(e.g., instruction encodings) and/or ABI (e.g., function prologue/epilogue formats) information,
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but also code-specific knowledge. This makes them significantly more effective. Such attacks can,
however, be easily thwarted by employing cryptographically robust encryption. Additionally, if
done at a fine granularity, reversing one block does not jeopardize the rest of the system. Polyglot
achieves both goals – it uses AES and ECC, and encrypts at the page-granularity – while being
performant and scalable.
3.6.2 Effectiveness
Polyglot is essentially meant to demonstrate that ISR is not just a defense against code-injection,
but can be an effective counter to code-reuse attacks as well. We discussed its effectiveness in the
former avatar in Section 5.2. Here we analyze its effectiveness against the latter.
Firstly, since we rely on static randomization, we are limited by its robustness. However since
Polyglot is independent of it, we assume it is impregnable for the sake of this discussion. We also
assume that the encryption used is strong enough to be practically irreversible.
As such, static ROP is clearly ineffective since the code memory differs from the attacker’s
expectation of it based on his own copy. Furthermore, attempts at reading plain code at runtime
will also fail since the read code cannot be disassembled sanely. Thus, Polyglot is completely
secure against static as well as JIT-ROP attacks based on runtime code-scanning.
However, since ISR does not modify data layout, it is susceptible to information disclosures
through data. Consequently, if one were to leak function pointers, it is possible to carry out
function-reuse attacks such as ret2libc [35] and COOP [30, 98]. This is because although we
randomize the structure of the function, we do not change it functionally. Some forms of data-
space randomization [10, 18] and virtual-table protection mechanisms [bounov16, vtrust ] may
be effective in this context.
3.6.3 Proof-of-Concept Exploit
The main benefit of ISR against CRAs is that gadget-building attempts that rely on arbitrary mem-
ory reading capability to read a process’ code at runtime will fail because it reads encrypted code.
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Additionally since the code is strongly encrypted it cannot be reversed. Even if the attacker some-
how gains that ability, we keep the keys encrypted in memory.
To assess the effectiveness of Polyglot against direct ROP/JOP attacks, we retrofitted CVE-
2013-6282 to Linux kernel v3.8.1 (the original vulnerability affected the ARM v6 and v7 platforms
only). Next, we ported the respective (publicly-available) exploit [42] to the SPARC architecture
and verified that the exploit was successful on the vanilla kernel. Note that the original exploit for
CVE-2013-6282 did not use ROP; it used the return-to-user (ret2usr) technique [57], which relies
on forcing the kernel to execute shellcode placed in user space. We kept the relevant part(s) for
triggering the vulnerability, and replaced the shellcode with a ROP (SPARC) payload. Lastly, we
tested the exploit when the same kernel is statically randomized (using a simple scheme that entails
function permutation [11, 58] and NOP insertion [57]), and, as expected, it failed, as the respective
ROP payload relied on pre-computed gadget addresses, none of which remained correct.
As there are no publicly-available JIT-ROP exploits for the SPARC architecture, we retrofitted
an arbitrary read-and-write vulnerability in the debugfs pseudo-filesystem [28], reachable by
user mode4. Next, we modified the previous exploit to abuse this vulnerability and disclose the
locations of required gadgets by reading the (randomized) kernel .text section. Armed with
that information, the payload of the previously-failing exploit is adjusted accordingly. We first
tested with ISR enabled, to verify that JIT-ROP works as expected, and indeed bypasses the static
randomization scheme(s). Then, we enabled ISR and tried the modified exploit again. This attempt
failed, as the code could not be read. In addition, we verified that all code reads yield encrypted
content. Finally, reading page tables yielded the asymmetrically encrypted keys. We also verified
the above behavior using a hardware debugger by directly reading contents from memory.
4The vulnerability allows an attacker to set (from user mode) an unsigned long pointer to an arbitrary address
in kernel space, and read/write sizeof(unsigned long) bytes by dereferencing it.
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3.7 Ecosystem
Although we have discussed Polyglot in the context of a local system so far, security is ultimately
a full-system property and depends to a large extent on the entire operating ecosystem. Below we
will discuss some of the challenges of integrating Polyglot to contemporary software ecosystems,
and discuss possible solutions to mitigate them. As we observe below, although these challenges
are non-trivial, our scheme allows for a high degree of flexibility and can be adapted to most
deployment and distribution environments.
3.7.1 Challenges
Distribution Models. Current models of software distribution are based on dispersing a single bi-
nary variant globally, making them simple and efficient from a deployment perspective. On the
contrary, Polyglot requires every system have a secret and “personalized” binary version. This
requirement for one ISR binary variant per machine is non-trivial to accommodate in current dis-
tribution systems for multiple reasons.
Firstly, the process of ISR’izing every binary by randomizing and encrypting has to be carried
out either at the vendor or the user side. There are logistical challenges to both. At the vendor side,
customizing each binary will incur high overheads and may not be attractive from the perspective
of cost- and resource-efficiency for the vendor. At the user side, the main challenges involve error
reporting, patching, code signing, and other operations which do not lend themselves well to binary
heterogeneity. Impractical overheads (e.g., increased installation and load times) also have to be
avoided at all costs. Additionally, in closed source models, user side randomization would entail
binary rewriting, which have traditionally had performance and correctness issues [63].
Secondly, since Polyglot’s security is fundamentally dependent on the secrecy of the crypto-
graphic keys, any scheme has to prevent their leakage to malicious parties. Vendor side random-
ization implies that user keys will have to be shared with the vendors. This in turn increases the















Figure 3.7: Distribution scheme for Polyglot binaries. 1 Vendor generates binary and attaches
additional metadata to facilitate binary rewriting. 2 Binary rewriter at the client side uses this
metadata to randomize and encrypt the code, and generates final ISR binary.
are trusted, further disrupting currently established ecosystems.
Key Management. Furthermore, on a more local scope, our proposal so far espouses a single
asymmetric key pair per machine. This allows the private key to even be hard-coded into the chip5.
However, most systems today are multi-user and support virtualization of various guest systems.
To have a single key pair in this case would be impractical, undesirable, and insecure.
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3.7.2 Distribution Models
To address this challenge, we envision a solution that is largely based on recent work that miti-
gates the practical problems of integrating code randomization in contemporary distribution sys-
tems [61]. This is achieved by generating additional compiler metadata during compilation and
linking, with the goal of assisting arbitrary randomization schemes by binary rewriting, as well as
code encryption (as shown in Figure 3.7). By maintaining the metadata, this approach also allows
binary de-randomization so that bug reporting, patching, and other similar operations can be per-
formed as easily. As we discuss below, this approach is scalable while not being overly disruptive
of existing distribution mechanisms.
The open-source model presents the simple case, wherein the source code itself is procured, and
subsequently compiled and installed locally6. In this case, the binary can be completely ISR’ized
within the local machine, thus requiring no modifications in the distribution environment whatso-
ever. Any vendor side reporting (e.g., for bugs) would be preceded by de-randomization with the
help of binary metadata. The closed-source model, on the other hand, is slightly more complicated
and cannot accommodate the above solution as naively. In this scenario, we have software ven-
dors distributing a single binary as usual, but packing the compiler metadata into it as well. Once
downloaded on the local system, this metadata can then be used for accurate and flexible random-
ization at the user side. Note that knowledge of the metadata for a publicly available binary does
not compromise the randomization of the deployed ISR binaries.
Notably, in both cases, remote distribution, handling, and management of Polyglot keys be-
tween the vendor, the requesting machines, and/or any trusted centralized intermediary is unnec-
essary (although a trust in the developer is a minimum). The encryption process in both cases
can be performed within a container or enclave [75] for added security. As such, the additional
5In the extreme case, if physical tampering were a concern, the private key could even be based off a physically
unclonable function, which are hardware instance-specific signatures, usually based on some physical property unique
to it [44].
6Modern open source distributions (e.g., Linux-based ones) often employ package management systems, that in-
stall pre-compiled binaries rather than compiling individual programs. These systems can use a solution similar to that
for closed-source models.
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attack surface is reduced to securing the container and its usage locally. The modified installation
process, then, would just be similar to the original process, plus invoking this ISR’ization module.
3.7.3 Key Management
Multiple ISR domains within a single machine could be easily accommodated by making the
private key programmable, by introducing a special key register that can be loaded with the private
key. Isolation techniques, like SGX, can again be employed for safe key setting/unsetting. Thus,
in a multi-user system with per-user binaries, session setup could involve loading the user’s private
key in the key register. Alternatively, a more lax setup could involve loading a key-pair per binary.
Ultimately, any point on this spectrum of flexibility can be imposed by a privileged user. Similarly,
in a system with virtualization, the hardware can allow each guest to load their own private key.
Care must be taken, however, to extend guest isolation to keys (by unloading keys when guests are
switched, for instance).
3.8 Evaluation
To evaluate Polyglot, we implemented our design on a Xilinx Virtex5-based XUPV5-LX110T
FPGA board. Our implementation is based on the SPARC32-based Leon3 package, and our setup
has 256MB of RAM, a portion of which is used as a RAM disk (ramfs). On the software side,
we used Linux v3.8.1 and uClibc v0.9.33.2. The core utilities were provided through BusyBox
v1.23.2. Our system ran with encrypted versions of all the above modules, as well as an encrypted
bootloader. For hardware, we used the default Leon3 configuration, sporting an in-order SPARC32
core with no speculation or branch-prediction. Lastly, we use a 64-entry ITLB and a 4-way 32kB
I-cache.
It should be noted that even though we run regular workloads on our prototype, the FPGA plat-
form’s properties differ from a regular computer in ways that affect our results adversely. Given
that TLB and cache misses are the main sources of overhead, overhead reductions are bound to be
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significant, if structures comparable to those found in contemporary systems are used.7 Addition-
ally, decryption latency in our case is larger than the latency of memory fetches, while this is not
the case for regular systems — our prototype’s AES implementation takes 22 cycles to decrypt,
while memory fetch, in modern computers, takes about an order of magnitude longer [92].
3.8.1 Performance
SPEC. We ran the integer benchmarks of the SPEC CPU2006 benchmark suite [49]. Due to
memory limitations on the board, we could only run test inputs and were unable to run all the
benchmarks. Note that SPEC benchmarks have been shown to be redundant in metrics (i.e., I-
cache and ITLB misses) that are exactly relevant to us [94], and to the extent of our experiments,
our results corroborated those findings. Accordingly, perl should predictably have similar results
as go, while astar should be similar to sjeng. Hence, of the SPECint programs, only xalanc’s
behavior remains unknown.
Results are presented in Figure 3.8-a. We evaluate Polyglot with three configurations: without
randomization, and with function permutation and NOP insertion; in the former, the order of func-
tions in the final binary is randomized, while in the latter, we insert up to 8 NOPs at function entries
and after every call site, preceded by a jump to bypass the NOP-sled. Given that we are sensitive
to code-misses, these choices are significant (the former does not add to the code size, while the
latter does). From the observed data, we see that ISR incurs an overhead of 4.6%. gcc performs
particularly badly with an overhead of 24.9%, which was a result of an inordinately high rate of
ITLB misses (7,376.15 /sec, versus 115.34 /sec for the rest). In fact, if we neglect gcc, the rest of
the benchmarks have a mean overhead of 2.38%.
For the randomization schemes, function permutation does better, with an overhead of 5.3%,
while NOP insertion is more expensive: 7.4%. Again, gcc was the only outlier with 6% increase
in overhead, suffering 15,450 ITLB misses/sec. A similar trend is seen with the NOP insertion
7For example, ARM Cortex A-15 typically has multi-level caches, and corresponding TLBs, for each level, i.e., a



































































Figure 3.8: Performance overhead for SPEC and LMBench.
scheme. Note though that the NOP-randomized binaries themselves exhibit a mean overhead of
1.8%. Based on the above observations, we recommend using in-place code-randomization tech-
niques [89] in Polyglot that do not substantially add to code size. With better code-caching support,
however, this might be moot.
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Kernel. To evaluate the slowdown caused by the encryption of the kernel, we run the LMBench
kernel test suite [76] with the same set of variants. We measure the null system call as well as
a few other (critical) ones: read, write, stat, open/close. Importantly, we also measure
process creation latency with fork+{execve, /bin/sh, exit}. Figure 3.8-b shows the over-
head of encrypted (ISR) over native. We notice similar trends, with overheads for plain ISR being
the lowest (0-16%), and ISR+NOP exhibiting the highest cost (4-30%).
3.8.2 FPGA Implementation Results
Our modifications to the base Leon3 implementation increased LUT usage from 13,986 to 49,724,
a significant portion of which was taken up by the cryptoblocks (approx. 17k LUTs) and the
ITLB key storage table (approx. 12k LUTs). Since we did not optimize the accelerators for
this particular design, we believe that there is plenty of space for improvement (both in terms
of area and performance). For instance, instead of using two separate AES-128 accelerators to
decrypt a 256B cache-block, we could merge them to a single accelerator, since they share the same
key and have almost identical counters. Furthermore, our modifications to the Leon3 distribution
synthesizes at the same clock frequency.
3.9 Related Work
We covered prior ISR work in Section 5.2. In this section, we survey other hardware- and software-
based protection schemes, relevant to Polyglot.
• Code Diversification. This line of work seeks to prevent CRAs through diversification. More
specifically, this flavor of defenses randomize each instance of a binary, or execution, so that the
attacker has only a probabilistic chance of succeeding in finding the necessary gadgets. ASLR [91]
and many finer-granularity variants of it [63] were proposed towards this end. The common weak-
ness in this class of defenses is that the randomization is static, and relies on the fact that informa-
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tion about a particular instance (of it) cannot be leaked. It has, however, been shown that attacks
based on memory disclosure [14, 98, 99, 106] can dynamically harvest gadgets, thereby disproving
this assumption.
Recent defenses against the above can be mainly divided into three categories:
1 Execute-only Memory. Works in this area [5, 17, 29, 46] prevent dynamic code memory
scanning by making code pages execute-only. Just this measure, however, is not good enough since
code pointers can be harvested from data pages as well [26, 33]. Besides, this class of defenses
does not support intermingling data and code.
2 Code-pointer Hiding. Memory disclosures can be mitigated by preventing the leakage of
code pointers, direct (e.g., branch targets) or indirect (i.e., function pointers, return addresses), in
the first place. Previous work in this category [6, 29, 30, 70] achieved this via a level of hidden or
monitored indirection and/or encoding.
3 Gadget Invalidation. Such schemes dynamically modify the program’s structure (actively
or reactively) so that by the time the (harvested) gadgets are employed they are no longer avail-
able [12, 33, 115].
Polyglot broadly falls into category 1 . While previous proposals actively disallowed reading
code, essentially enforcing a no-read property on code pages, we allow code reads while obfuscat-
ing readable code. This, in turn, allows us to intermingle code and data, unlike other proposals.
We also show our work to be seamlessly applicable to higher-privileged system software. Lastly,
none of the previous schemes offers the degree of protection against static binary leaks that we do.
• Isolated Execution. These technologies provide a secure, opaque compartment for programs
to execute, without the risk of being spied on by other entities, even those executing at a higher
privilege level. First introduced in XOM [116], a slew of software [73, 74] and hardware [41,
65, 112] based techniques have since been proposed; Intel’s SGX [75] is an example of the latter
category.
In particular, the latter category seeks to provide integrity and confidentiality of both code
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and data, even in the presence of a malicious operating system. The idea is to achieve security
by encrypting code and data outside the TCB (typically the processor), while providing isolation
within. Some schemes include memory within their TCB, and simply decrypt the sensitive code
at load time, while guaranteeing its integrity thereafter. Others decrypt instructions as they stream
into the processor. Although used in other contexts [103, 111, 127], as far as we know, we are the
first to employ symmetric encryption in counter mode in order to mask the instruction-decryption
overhead. Additionally, isolation techniques cannot cleanly support shared libraries, due to their
strict threat model, requiring extensive changes to software. Design changes further need to ensure
the proper modularization of secure components lest the attacker gains entry into a compartment.
In brief, we avoid the complexities of the larger problem isolation targets, and, thus, are able to
provide a more lightweight solution.
3.10 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present the design of Polyglot, a hardware-based ISR scheme, which eschews
weak cryptography, as used by previous ISR proposals, by employing AES and ECC at the page
granularity. We also develop microarchitectural optimizations to reduce performance overheads
typically associated with hardware implementations of these cryptographic algorithms. Our so-
lution enables page sharing between applications and strong encryption with low performance
overheads. Furthermore, we allow instructions to be encrypted right from system boot. Most
importantly, we show how Polyglot can counter state-of-the-art ROP attacks, which ISR was tra-
ditionally considered ineffectual against. These features have not been achieved in any prior ISR
implementation, and, therefore, provide a promising primitive.
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CHAPTER 4
Practical Memory Safety with REST
Programmers using type unsafe langauges such as C and C++ create many opportunities for at-
tackers to exploit memory safety violations. The severity and prevelance of the memory safety
problem combined with the demand for low-overhead solutions has renewed interest in hardware
support to mitigate these problems.
In this chapter, we discuss Random Embedded Secret Tokens (REST ), a simple hardware prim-
itive to provide content-based checks, and show how it can be used to mitigate common types of
spatial and temporal memory errors at very low cost. REST is simply a very large random value that
is embedded into programs. To provide memory safety, REST is used to bookend data structures
during allocation. If the hardware accesses a REST value during execution, due to programming
errors or adversarial actions, it reports a privileged memory safety exception.
Implementing REST requires 1 bit of metadata per L1 data cache line and a comparator to check
for REST tokens during a cache fill. The software infrastructure to provide memory safety with
REST reuses a production-quality memory error detection tool, AddressSanitizer, by changing less
than 1.5K lines of code.
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REST based memory safety offers several advantages compared to extant methods: (1) it does
not require significant redesign of hardware or software, (2) the overhead of heap and stack safety
is 2% compared to 40% for a software equivalent (AddressSanitizer), (3) the security of the mem-
ory safety implementation is improved compared AddressSanitizer, and (4) REST based memory
safety can mitigate heap safety errors in legacy binaries without recompilation or source code.
These advantages provide a significant step towards continuous runtime memory safety monitor-
ing and mitigation for legacy and new binaries.
4.1 Introduction
Memory corruption errors have been one of the most persistent and long-standing problems in
computer security. However, practical and effective solutions to this challenge, although critical to
secure program operation, remains an elusive goal to this day. In fact, heap-based memory attacks,
exploiting out-of-bounds heap read/writes and use-after-free (UAF) bugs alone, accounted for 80%
of root causes that led to remote code execution (RCE) in Microsoft software in 2015 [125].
Previous hardware techniques to address memory safety concerns are broadly based on two
approaches—whitelisting safe memory regions and blacklisting (some portion of) unsafe memory
regions. Previous work in the former approach, broadly referred to as bounds checking, associates
metadata with every pointer indicating the bounds of the data structure it can legitimately access,
and flagging any access outside those bounds as memory errors. In the latter approach, commonly
called the tripwire approach, critical locations in the address space (for instance, both ends of an
array) are marked invalid and any access to them raises a memory violation exception.
Whitelisting approaches [36, 45, 53, 79, 80, 126] offer stronger security guarantees since they
monitor all memory accesses against exact bounds. Another advantage to per-pointer metadata is
that some of these mechanisms also maintain liveness/version information about data structures
they point to, thus detecting dangling pointers in addition to out-of-bound errors. However, they
suffer from one or more of the following problems.
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1 Performance Overhead. Since they monitor every pointer dereference, the performance
overhead scales with the number of dynamic pointer dereferences. For each of these dereferences
there is at least one additional memory instruction for loading the meta data and one comparison
operation for checking the data. Even if some overhead can be mitigated by optimizations such as
caching, the energy overheads due to the additional instructions are not easily mitigated.
2 Implementation Overhead. They usually require significant hardware modifications in-
cluding modifications to the cache hierarchy [36, 79], execution pipeline [36, 53, 79], or even
addition of coprocessors [126].
3 Inaccurate/incomplete Coverage. Since most of them rely on static pointer analyses
for metadata propagation during pointer operations, any inaccuracy in pointer identification leads
to incorrect/unstable program behavior. This is especially problematic in the C-memory model,
which allows interchangeability between pointer and native data types [24]. Additionally, this also
necessitates source code availability, thus preventing such techniques from being compatible with
legacy binaries.
Alternatively, tripwires, originally proposed for software, are not a commonly explored tech-
nique in hardware [96, 107]. These techniques provide a relatively fast mechanism for marking
memory locations invalid. By associating metadata with the locations instead of their pointers,
they avoid metadata propagation costs, thus mitigating some drawbacks of whitelisting techniques.
However, this comes at the expense of weaker security guarantees since they do not detect all spa-
tial violations (specifically ones that access unmarked regions). In fact, these techniques target a
specific access pattern which is commonly responsible for memory overflows. This pattern man-
ifests itself when the program sequentially starts accessing locations beyond the bounds of the
data structure (in a loop, for instance). Previous attempts at hardware support for tripwire imple-
mentation have required non-trivial hardware modifications (including storage of metadata) and/or
incurred non-trivial performance penalty. Furthermore, previous hardware techniques in this cate-
gory only focus on detecting out-of-bounds accesses and do not address temporal memory safety
even though it accounted for 51% of RCE exploits in Microsoft software in 2015, whereas the
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former accounted for 28.5% [125].
Additionally, checks performed by previous schemes were tag-based, in that they use metadata
tags, stored in a region separate from program data, to compare and verify access validity. This, in
turn, requires (explicit or implicit) out-of-band fetching and processing of metadata.
In this chapter, we propose Random Embedded Security Tokens (REST ), a hardware primitive
for content-based checks, and describe a framework based on a primitive enabling programs to
blacklist memory regions at a low overhead. This primitive allows the program to store a long
unique value, a token, in the memory locations to be blacklisted and issues a privileged REST
exception if it is ever touched with a regular access. We propose a low overhead, low complexity
microarchitecture for detecting these tokens. When an L1 data cache line is filled, that memory line
is checked for the REST token value and if so, marked as such. If a memory instruction accesses
that marked line, we throw an exception. These hardware modifications are trivial, requiring no
modifications to either the core design, or the coherence and consistency implementations of the
cache, even for multicore, out-of-order processors. Ours is also the first scheme to rely on content-
based checks wherein the metadata is stored alongside program data and requires no modification
of the program’s overall memory layout. Token checks are performed directly on all data accessed
by the program and requires no behind-the-scene metadata processing.
The rest of our framework is based on a software tripwire-based scheme, AddressSanitizer
(ASan) [100], which consists of a compilation framework and runtime library that automatically
fortifies programs against memory errors without any programmer effort. ASan is a highly popular
memory error detector, used in the testing infrastructure of production softwares such as Fire-
fox [43] and Chromium [25]. However, due to its high performance overhead (~1.4x), it is mainly
used for software testing and debugging, not in deployment builds. Comparatively, REST incurs
an overhead of 2% on the SPEC benchmarks while not only providing the same scope of protec-
tion as ASan, but even improving its security in several aspects. Moreover, our technique is also
able to provide heap safety for legacy binaries at similar overheads. Additionally, as we show
later, the observed overheads are completely attributable to the software framework; our hardware
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1 int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) {
2 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0];
3 unsigned short hbtype = *p++;
4 unsigned int payload;
5
6 /* Attacker-controlled memcpy length */
7 n2s(p, payload);
8
9 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) {
10 unsigned char *buffer =
11 OPENSSL_malloc(payload);
12
13 /* Vulnerable OOB memory read */
14 memcpy(buffer, p, payload);
15 ...
Listing 4.1: Heartbleed out-of-bounds memory read bug.
primitive incurs nearly zero additional performance overhead, and has negligible implementation
complexity.
We illustrate the basic idea of our defense with a simplified version of CVE-2014-0160 [31], a
bug commonly known as the Heartbleed vulnerability reported in OpenSSL 1.0.1, as shown in the
code shown in Listing 4.1.
Line 7 in the listed routine contains the overflow bug wherein the payload length, payload,
is used to determine the size of data to be copied into the response packet without checking its
validity. The resulting exploit can then be used to leak sensitive information such as passwords,
usernames, secret keys etc., to the client. Furthermore, common protections involving (stack or
heap) canaries would be unable to detect this attack, since it involves a read overflow and does not
otherwise corrupt any program state. To prevent this, REST tokens are placed around the source
buffer to be copied, so that when access goes beyond its bounds, a security exception is triggered,






































Figure 4.1: (A) Unsanitized memcpy bug reads sensitive data outside the benign buffer. (B) REST
tokens placed around the buffer detects this out-of-bounds access.
4.2 Motivation
Functionally, REST provides similar safety features as ASan, a state-of-the-art memory error de-
tector widely used for verification and debugging. Despite its effectiveness, it is not used as a live
security scheme due to its performance overheads.
ASan implements a software tripwire-based system, wherein blacklisted zones (also called
redzones) are placed around sensitive data structures. It then detects erroneous program behavior
that leads to illegitimate accesses of these location (in case of an overflow, for instance). To do so,
ASan primarily relies on two techniques — shadow memory and memory access instrumentation
(see Figure 4.2). Firstly, it reserves a chunk of memory, called shadow memory, that contains
metadata and should never be explicitly accessed by the program. The rest of the address space
maps to its corresponding shadow location via a simple mapping function. Additionally, ASan
imposes memory-safe program behavior by checking the validity of every memory access against
the metadata for the accessed location. This is achieved by statically instrumenting the program to













Figure 4.2: Code and address space transformation done by ASan. Memory accesses are instru-
mented to check against the corresponding value in the shadow memory (dark region in figure),
calculable with a simple mapping function, f .
regions are marked invalid by zeroing out the corresponding metadata.
Sources of Overhead. In terms of performance, ASan has four major sources of overhead. 1
ASan uses a custom allocator designed with security in mind that maintains separate pools for free
memory (from which new allocations are made) and deallocated memory (consisting of recent
deallocations), and allows virtually no allocation reuse in order to prevent use-after-free (UAF)
errors. Hence, it is slower than other allocators which are primarily designed with performance as
a first-order feature. 2 ASan inserts code at function prologues and epilogues to modify the stack
frame by inserting and aligning stack variables in order to deter stack attacks. 3 Instrumentation
for validating memory accesses, as discussed above, also contributes towards ASan’s slowdown.
4 Furthermore, since memory checks cannot be inserted in third party libraries, ASan partially
mitigates the problem by intercepting common libc data-handling API calls (e.g.,strcpy and
memcpy) to verify that no invalid access occurs therein for the particular set of arguments.
Figure 4.3 provides a breakdown of these components for the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks sim-
ulated on an in-order core1. As we see in the figure, memory access checks ( 3 and 4 ) account
for the most persistent and grievous source of overhead, although the allocator also contributes



































Figure 4.3: Breakdown of various sources of overhead in ASan with respect to a plain binary using
libc’s allocator.
significantly for benchmarks that make frequent heap allocations. In the subsequent sections, we
show how our scheme removes the overheads associated with most of these components.
Notably, ASan’s developers also consider potential hardware assistance [2] to speed up meta-
data lookup and memory access checks transparently by encoding the corresponding logic within
a single architectural instruction in a design similar to Watchdoglite [80]. As such, ASan-fortified
programs could compress the entire memory-access validation into a single instruction, thus op-
timizing the expensive operations, but not necessarily removing them. Furthermore, although
Watchdoglite has been shown to be highly effective for memory safety in its own respect, such a
design would suffer from some of the drawbacks of bounds checking schemes discussed earlier
and would necessarily require recompilation. We discuss and contrast similar hardware techniques
in more detail in section 4.7.
4.3 Hardware Design
Since REST hardware aims to detect and flag accesses to tokens, our main challenge is to be per-
formant by hiding latencies associated with additional memory checks, while maintaining existing
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microarchitectural optimizations and ensuring the integrity of token semantics. Modifications for
REST consists of extending the ISA with two new instructions and an exception type, as well as
microarchitectural modifications to support them with minimal overhead. We discuss these aspects
of the REST primitive design below.
4.3.1 ISA Modifications
The width of the token is that of a cache line (64B in our system), and its value is held in a token
configuration register (which is not directly accessible to user-level applications). Two instructions
are added to set (store) and unset (remove) tokens in the application:
1 arm <reg> This instruction stores a token at location specified in register reg, which
should be capable of addressing the entire address space. The implicit operand in this instruction is
the token value stored in the token configuration register. The specified location has to be aligned
to the token width, otherwise a precise invalid REST instruction exception is generated.
2 disarm <reg> This instruction overwrites a token at location specified in the register
<reg>, which should be capable of addressing the entire address space, with the value zero. The
specified location also has to be aligned to the token width, otherwise a precise invalid REST
instruction exception is generated. Additionally, in case there is no token at the location, a REST
exception is generated as well.
When a REST exception is triggered, the exception is handled by the next higher privilege
level. If the exception is generated at the highest privilege mode, we consider it a fatal exception.
We also assume the faulting address is passed in an existing register.
Setting the token value is done through a store instruction that writes to a memory-mapped
address. Depending on the token width, one or more stores might be necessary to set the full token
value. This operation can only be performed by a higher privileged mode.
We also provide two modes of operation, debug and secure. The secure mode is expected to be
the typical mode of operation for programs in deployment and does not guarantee precise recovery













Figure 4.4: Hardware modifications for REST include an extra metadata bit per cache line in L1
data cache indicating whether it contains a token, and the token detector to examine incoming data
from lower caches and fill the token value into evicted lines.
debug mode, the entire program state at the time of REST exception can be precisely recovered
by the exception handler. Thus, this mode is intended for use by developers. The current mode of
operation can be configured by setting a bit in the token configuration register.
4.3.2 Microarchitecture
In our design, loads and stores check the accessed data against the token value and raise an excep-
tion in case of a match. Thus, logically each load becomes a load followed by a comparison of the
loaded value with the token, while a store becomes a load of the value to be overwritten, a compar-
ison with the token value, followed by the store. Additionally, reading and/or writing a 64B token
value would involve data transfers over multiple cycles, since data buses are narrower. Naively
implemented, this could increase the latency and energy of memory operations significantly.
We show a novel construction for REST that minimizes changes to load store pipelines and
latency for memory operations. Our key observation is that checks necessary for the REST system
can be performed when the cache lines are installed or accessed instead of explicitly fetching the
values and checking them.
CacheModifications. We extend each cache line in the L1 data cache to include one additional
bit to indicate if that line contains a token. Note that since tokens are aligned, a token is guaranteed
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to be contained within a single line. When a cache line is being installed, the value of that line is
compared to the token value register and in case of a match, the token bit corresponding to that
line is set. Since cache fills typically happen over multiple cycles the token comparison can be
decomposed into small manageable compare operation, say a 32b compare per cache fill stage, to
reduce energy. After the fill, memory operations that access lines with the token bit set are flagged
to throw a REST exception.
A disarm instruction unsets the token bit corresponding to the accessed line and concurrently
zeroes out the entire cache line. Since such an operation involves all data banks of the cache,
disarm writes incur an additional, typically one cycle, latency. Additionally, disarms raise a REST
exception if the token bit is not set on the destination line, thus ensuring that the program can only
disarm armed locations. The arm instruction sets the token bit of the accessed line, but does not
write the token value into it; the token values are written out when the line is evicted from the L1
data cache. This construction ensures that arm operations that hit in the cache complete in a sin-
gle cycle, despite being a wide write. Our construction works naturally for write-allocate caches,
which is one of the most commonly used allocation policies supported in current microarchitec-
tures.
LSQ Modification. Since arm and disarm instructions write values, they are functionally
stores and handled as such in the microarchitecture with one key difference. Unlike stores, the
arm and disarm instructions should not forward their values to younger loads, as this will violate
the invariant that the REST token must be a secret. One simple way to provide this invariant is to
serialize the execution of arm and disarm execution, i.e., ensure that an arm or disarm instruction is
the only inflight instruction when it is encountered in the decode stage. This option, while simple
to implement, can introduce significant performance penalities.
Instead of serialization, we next describe design to prevent such forwarding in a common (and
complex) structure used to support store to load forwarding, the load-store queue (LSQ). Consider
a scenario where an arm request is closely followed by a read to the same cache line. In this case
the load may “hit" the in-flight arm in the LSQ, thus forwarding an otherwise illegal read. When
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Action LSQ Cache Hit Cache Miss
Arm Create entry in SQ, tag as arm. Set token bit Fetch line, set token bit.
Disarm Raise exception if SQ has dis-
arm for same location. Else in-
sert entry with no store value
in SQ, tag as disarm.
If token bit unset, raise excep-
tion. Else clear line, unset token
bit(s).
Fetch line, set token bit if it has
token. Proceed as hit.
Load If value can be forwarded from
armed SQ entry, raise excep-
tion. As usual otherwise.
If token bit set, raise exception.
Else read data.
Fetch line, set token bit if it has
token. Proceed as hit.
Store (Se-
cure)
Raise exception if SQ has arm
for same location. As usual
otherwise.
If token bit set, raise exception.
Else write data.
Fetch line, set token bit if it has
token. Proceed as hit.
Store (De-
bug)
Raise exception if SQ has arm
for same location. As usual
otherwise.
If token bit set, raise exception.
Else write data.
Fetch line, set token bit if it has




N/A As usual. As usual.
Eviction N/A If token bit set, fill token value
in outgoing packet.
N/A
Table 4.1: Actions taken on various operations for L1-D cache hits and misses.
this case is encountered, we throw a privileged REST exception.
This exception support can be implemented without any additional state or impact on LSQ
access timing. To do so, we incorporate the REST violation check into the existing matching logic
simply by breaking the match down to perform two matches — one an address match for the cache
line address and another for the remaining— and adding a few logic gates (as shown in Figure 4.5).
Additionally since the arm and disarm write values are implicit and known by the cache, we do
not attach a value with the corresponding entry in the store queue. With these modifications, LSQ
access latencies and data widths remain unchanged despite the introduction of very wide writes.
Such address modifications may be necessary at other places in the microarchitecture where store
to load forwarding may occur.
Exception Reporting. We can further optimize the performance cost of REST by being flexble
about how and when exceptions are reported. Supporting precise exceptions with REST requires
disabling performance optimizations such as critical-word first, and early and eager commit of





















Figure 4.5: Modifications to the LSQ. Added structures are noted in darker shade.
ported precisely especially when it is used for monitoring for security violations during deployment
as in these cases the user is typically interested in knowing if a security violation occurred or not,
and not the state of the machine when the violation occurred.
If the L1 data cache supports critical-word first fetching, the access request may be satisfied
before the whole line has arrived and a match determined. This creates the possibility of a delay
between load commit and the security check, especially when the load is at the head of the ROB and
is committed as soon as the critical word arrives but the entire line has not. In the debugmode, loads
are not released from the miss status handling registers (MSHRs) as long as the delivered word
partially matches the token value. On a mismatch, the load is released without any performance
penalty. In the secure mode, REST exception is reported independent of the load commit.
Additionally, since stores are committed from the ROB as soon as the store/arm/disarm be-
comes the oldest instruction, REST violations due to a faulty access might not be resolved in time.
By the time the violation is detected at the cache and the response is received at the ROB, the
offending instruction may have retired. This will result in an imprecise REST exception. In the de-
bug mode, we guarantee precise exceptions by delaying store commit until writes complete. These
modifications in commit logic are summarized in Figure 4.6.
















Figure 4.6: Flowchart showing write commit logic for REST .
it can be reduced for security and performance reasons. For instance, instead of a full cache line
width, half or quarter cache line tokens may be used. Most changes described above can be simply
scaled to accommodate this. For instance, the token value register can be smaller, and the number
of token bits per line will increase to 2 and 4 for 32- and 16-byte tokens respectively. Because
of the simplicity of scaling, the same system can accommodate multiple token widths and switch
according to the needs of the executing program.
4.4 Software Design
The REST primitive described above provides programs the capability to blacklist certain memory
locations and disallow regular accesses to them. In this section, we describe how programs can




We base our software design on ASan, which is a highly popular open-source memory error de-
tection tool. REST ’s software framework, however, uses tokens instead of metadata to denote
redzones. This obviates two major components of ASan’s original design. Since our hardware
continuously detects access to tokens without software intervention, monitoring every program
read and write in software becomes unnecessary. Thus, memory operations no longer need to
be instrumented for checking access validity. Secondly, since REST tokens do not require sep-
arate maintenance of metadata, the need for shadow memory is eliminated as well. Combined,
this essentially eliminates the two major sources of ASan’s performance and memory overheads,
simplifying its implementation complexity.
Protecting the Stack. As shown in Figure 4.7, protecting vulnerable stack variables involves
placing redzones around it. This is done by code added at the function prologue, so redzones isolate
these variables from the other local variables. The size of each redzone is chosen as a multiple of
the token width and is based on the size of the data structure. Subsequently, overflows during the
frame’s lifetime are detected when accesses go past their boundaries and into one of the redzones.
Code is also inserted at the function epilogue to clean up the tokens so that future frames inherit a
clean stack.
Since the above changes involve modifying the stack layout, REST requires that binaries be
compiled with our plugin. However, since stack attacks have become an insignificant threat vector
in recent years [125], users may also choose to forego stack protection, if performance is a concern,
and just opt for heap protection as described next.
Protecting the Heap. REST secures the heap with a custom allocator adapted from ASan.
Spatial heap protection is provided by ensuring that the allocator surrounds every allocation with
redzones (see Figure 4.7). These redzones not only separate the allocations from each other but
also from the metadata.
Temporal bugs are prevented by filling all freed allocations with tokens and placing them in
a separate quarantine pool, instead of the pool of free memory from which new allocations are
67
void foo() {
  char redzone1[64];
  char arr[16];
  char padding[48];














































Figure 4.7: (A) For stack safety we instrument the program to insert tokens around vulnerable
buffers. (B) Our allocator provides heap safety by surrounding allocations with tokens and black-
listing deallocated regions in the quarantine pool.
assigned. They remain there until the free memory pool has been sufficiently consumed at which
point, they are disarmed and released for reallocation. Hence, UAF attacks are mitigated since
freed allocations remain blacklisted and any attempts at accessing them via dangling pointers or
double frees are caught.
We make one modification to ASan’s free pool management however. ASan originally main-
tains the invariant that all entries in its free and quarantine pool be blacklisted. This necessitates
blacklisting newly mapped region from the system, and mark them valid just before allocation. For
REST we relax the invariant to guarantee that only quarantined regions are blacklisted while those
in the free pool are zeroed. This is because blacklisting, in our case, involves storing tokens all
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over the newly mapped regions and is hence slower than just rewriting corresponding metadata as
is done by ASan. Our invariant is maintained for reused regions since disarms zero out memory
before they are moved to the free pool and reallocated, thus avoiding uninitialized data leaks.
One key advantage of our protection mechanism is that it works with legacy binaries. Since
REST performs memory access checks in hardware, heap protection in our case does not require
any instrumentation of the original program and can thus be availed even by legacy binaries, as long
as our custom allocator is used (with LD_PRELOAD environment variable in Unix-based systems,
for instance).
Porting to dlmalloc. ASan was originally designed for effectiveness, not performance. Its
allocator follows the same principle and is, hence, significantly slower than other popular allo-
cators. So, in order to test the portability of our scheme and simultaneously switch to a lower
overhead alternative, we implemented the principles outlined above to dlmalloc, a classic allo-
cator from which glibc’s allocator is derived2. Functionally, the modifications were exactly as
described above. The quarantine list was implemented as a simple queue of freed allocations. Once
the ceiling of quarantined memory is reached, allocations are released in FIFO order until the size
of the pool goes below the stipulated maximum. This naive releasing scheme, however, introduces
the security problem of predictability. We discuss this aspect more in Section 4.5.
Overall, the entire porting process was fairly straight-forward and did not require modification
of the allocator’s core algorithm. Overall, our changes added only about 200 LoC to the original.
4.4.2 System Level Support
At the system level, we propose having a single token value. As will be discussed in section 4.5, the
token widths are sufficiently long that the chances of a random program value matching a token is
vanishingly small (see subsection 4.5.2). However, leaking this value via physical or side-channel
attacks might still be possible and would compromise the entire system. So periodically this token
value can be rotated (at reboot, for instance). Our design for heap safety allows this model without
2Besides other optimizations, dlmalloc does not have thread safety, whereas the glibc allocator does.
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the need for recompilation.
Alternatively, a unique token value could be used for every process with the OS maintaining
them across context switches. This design requires some changes to the OS such as the generation
of token values and the ability to deal with tokens from different processes when processes are
cloned or communicate with each other.
4.5 Hardware/Software Security
4.5.1 Threat Model
In line with recent related work regarding memory error based attacks and defenses, we assume the
following in and of our system. The target program has one or more memory vulnerabilities, that
can be exploited by an attacker operating at the same privilege level to gain arbitrary read and/or
write capabilities within the execution context. We do not make any assumptions as to how these
vulnerabilities arise or what attack vectors are used to exploit them. We also assume that the target
has common hardware defenses available in most systems today (e.g., NX-bit). Furthermore, we
assume that the hardware is trusted and does not contain and/or is not subjected to bugs arising
from improper usage parameters resulting in glitching, physical, or side-channel attacks.
4.5.2 Hardware Discussion
In this section, we discuss the security implications of our token primitive independent of the
software framework utilizing it.
• Token Width. A key assumption of our design is that token detection does not suffer from false
positives, which occur when token exceptions are triggered by a legitimate chunk of program data.
Three conditions have to be met for this.
1 The data chunk equals token value,
2 It is aligned to token width, and
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3 It is fetched into the L1 data cache, thus passing through the token detector. If data tran-
siently acquires the token value while already in L1 data cache or any other part of the memory
subsystem, no exception is raised.
To avoid false positives, it is therefore critical not only to choose a properly random token value
but also an appropriate token width. In our design we choose a width of 512 bits, which makes the
chances for a program data chunk causing a false positive less than 1
2512
3. Alternatively, smaller
token widths of 256, 128 or even 64 bits are also usable for overhead reduction. As discussed in
section 4.3, these widths should entail minimal changes in our original design and can be supported
simultaneously. In such systems, depending on the requirement models, it is possible to have a
scheme where programs execute with low token widths first and restart with higher token widths
in case a REST exception is detected.
• Immutability and Unmaskability. REST makes sure that once a token is set, it can only be
removed through a disarm operation and cannot be otherwise overwritten (or even read) by any
process at the current privilege level. Additionally, REST exceptions cannot be masked from the
same privilege level. These measures ensure that adversaries cannot exploit inter-process, inter-
core, or inter-cache interactions to bypass token semantics.
• Detector Placement. We place our detector at the the L1 data cache in order to keep the other
caches unmodified and hence, minimize design costs. Consequently, however, REST does not
catch token accesses via means that completely sidestep the cache (e.g., DMA).
4.5.3 Software Discussion
While REST is based on ASan, it improves upon ASan’s security in a number of ways. In this
section, we elaborate upon the weaknesses of ASan, if/how REST mitigates them, and whether we
3For simple reference, a maximum of 248 token-aligned data chunks can reside in a 64b address space simultane-
ously. Additionally, a modern system operating at 3GHz would need ~10145 years to guess a 512b random value via
simple increment operations.
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introduce any vulnerabilities of our own.
• False Negatives. Token width affects token alignment and therefore, the target data structures4.
Imposing this granularity on program data, in turn, introduces small gaps between variables. For
instance, in Figure 4.7, REST adds a pad space adjacent to an array to conform to the granularity
requirement (64B in the figure). This introduces the scope for false negatives, wherein REST is
unable to detect overflows that are small enough to spill into the pad, but not into the token itself.
This implies that although we still protect against read/write overflows, our system is vulnerable
uninitialized data leaks in the stack [69], which can be simply prevented by zeroing out the padding
or using narrower tokens. Uninitialized data leaks are not a problem in the heap, however, due to
our invariant that all regions in our allocator’s free pool are zeroed.
• Brute-force Disarm. Our decision to mandate precise specification of an armed location while
disarming is to counter a scenario when an attacker has somehow obtained control of a disarm
gadget (i.e., can influence its address argument), but does not accurately know the layout regarding
which memory locations are specifically armed. In such a scenario, this design decision prevents
attackers from blindly disarming swathes of memory regions. Properly compiled code, however,
should have no problems due to this stipulation.
• Privilege. Although used in some security mechanisms [121], ASan was primarily developed
for debugging. While it can serve as a security tool under weak threat models and performance
requirements, realistically it has limited utility as one. This is primarily because its framework is
implemented at the same privilege level as the program itself. While the location of shadow mem-
ory is randomized, it remains open to memory disclosure attacks, upon which the metadata can
be easily tampered with. Memory access monitoring, while statically baked into the program, can
also be subverted with carefully crafted code gadgets or even simple code injection. We overcome
this issue by raising a REST violation on a token, regardless of privilege.
• Handling setjmp/longjmp. Since the program can neither probe for the presence of a
token, nor does it keep a log of all armed locations, disarming necessarily needs to be carried out
4ASan also imposes alignment on protected data structures [1].
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in the presence of a known reference point. For the stack, frames serve this purpose, i.e., for a
given function, arms/disarms occur at fixed offsets within the frame. Consequently, we could not
extend REST ’s protection to support programs that use setjmp/longjmp since these instructions
alter the stack layout. ASan takes a very conservative approach in such cases by zeroing out the
metadata, and hence whitelisting the entire region of the current stack. We cannot take the same
approach since we do not keep track of active tokens on the stack. Providing a secure and cheap
mechanism for handling this case remains a topic of future research.
• Predictability. Our design, as well as ASan’s, suffers from predictable layout as attackers can
simply jump over redzones (countered to some extent by adjusting redzone size according to the
buffer size). Although we do not use it in our system, we recommend that REST be used in
conjunction with some variant of layout randomization, depending on the usage scenario. Layout
randomization for the heap [9, 85] and stack[20, 89] have already seen a significant amount of
work in recent times and has been shown to be easily and effectively applicable. Alternatively,
programs could also sprinkle arbitrary tokens across the data region in a configurable manner
to catch such attempts. Furthermore, randomization could also be added to the order in which
quarantined memory is released in order to augment temporal safety provided by this technique.
• Temporal Protection. In terms of temporal safety, ASan’s, and consequently our guarantees
are incomplete since we unmark previously allocated blocks when we reallocate them, after which
point, dangling pointers or double frees can no longer be detected. This can be prevented to
some extent by using heuristics such as reducing reallocation predictability by maintaining some
degree of randomness for new allocations and ensuring that its entropy is never compromised by
maintaining a large enough free memory pool. In our setup, however, we rely on ASan’s existing
allocation algorithm and do not augment it any further.
• Composability and Coverage. In order for ASan to be effective, all memory accesses to user
data need to be monitored. Hence, it is essential that all software modules (the main program and
shared libraries) be compiled with ASan support. Consider a situation where the program itself






BPred L-TAGE, 1+12 components, 31k entries total
Fetch 8 wide, 64-entry IQ
Issue 8 wide, 192-entry ROB





L1-I 64kB, 8-way, 2 cycles, 64B blocks, LRU replacement, 4 20-entry
MSHRs, no prefetch
L1-D 64kB, 8-way, 2 cycles, 64B blocks, LRU replacement, 8-entry write
buffer, 4 20-entry MSHRs, no prefetch
L2 2MB, 16-way, 20 cycles, 64B blocks, LRU replacement, 8-entry write
buffer, 20 12-entry MSHRs, no prefetch
Memory DDR3, 800 MHz, 8GB, 13.75ns CAS latency and row precharge, 35ns
RAS latency
Table 4.2: Simulation base hardware configuration.
faulty code resulting in buffer overflow and it operates on a ASan-augmented buffer, the scope for
exploitation still remains since read/writes in the library are not being monitored. The reverse situa-
tion also applies when the fortified code is in the ASan-augmented program but the data originates
in the library, since the foreign buffer does not have the right bookends. Hence, ASan requires
both access monitoring and metadata maintenance, one or both of which might break when using
non-ASan augmented modules. Analysing and instrumenting the shared libraries at runtime would
incur a huge performance penalty (as demonstrated by tools like Valgrind [83])5.
REST relaxes this requirement greatly by not requiring explicit access monitoring. Thus, as
long as the data itself is properly bookended, it does not matter whether the code accessing it has
been instrumented or not. As such, it is more compatible with untreated external libraries. Since





We implement REST in the out-of-order CPU model of gem5 [13] for the x86 architecture. Due
to its limited support for large memory mappings, we were unable to run x86/64 binaries since
gem5 could not accommodate ASan’s shadow memory requirements. Consequently, we simulate
32-bit i386 binaries of the SPEC CPU2006 C/C++ benchmark on the modified simulator in the
syscall emulation mode with a configuration shown in Table 4.2. The arm and disarm instruc-
tions were implemented by appropriating the encodings for x86’s xsave and xrstor instructions
respectively, which are themselves unimplemented in gem5.
The benchmarks were compiled with Clang v5.0.0 with "-mno-omit-leaf-frame-pointer
-fno-optimize-sibling-calls -fno-omit-frame-pointer -mno-sse -O3" flags. We
run these programs to completion with the test input set. Since executions with these inputs spend a
significant amount of time initializing (and allocating) compared to the ref input set, this choice of
input sets should reflect on our results adversely since the overheads associated with our allocator
will not be amortized with computation as well as in the case of ref inputs.
To evaluate REST , we compare it against two baselines— unsafe, plain binaries using the stock
libc allocator, and binaries fortified with ASan. We evaluate two modes, secure with imprecise
exception and debug with precise exceptions, for two defensive scopes, full (i.e., stack and heap)
and heap only. Additionally, we present another category of numbers for perfect, zero overhead
REST hardware (referred as PerfectHw) as a limit study of the current hardware design’s optimal-
ity. The results are presented for each benchmark in Figure 4.8 as slowdowns relative to the unsafe
binary.
REST vs. Baseline. In the secure mode, REST shows an overhead of 26% and 22% while
providing full or heap safety respectively. For the debug mode, the corresponding values are 71%
5ASan mitigates this to some extent by intercepting common library calls (like strcpy), checking the input data















































Figure 4.8: Runtime overheads (over plain) of ASan and REST in the debug, secure, and perfect











































Figure 4.9: Runtime overheads (over plain) of using 16B, 32B and 64B tokens in secure mode.
and 64% respectively. In both modes, we find that the overall trend is roughly consistent with
the results presented in Figure 4.3. Relative to ASan, REST does not perform memory checks
(via explicit program instrumentation or libc call interception). In case of just heap safety, it
additionally does not bear the cost of stack instrumentation. Accordingly, we observe that the
numbers for REST ’s full safety follow the expected trend. gcc and xalanc exhibit especially high
overheads since they use the allocator more frequently than others (as also indicated in Figure 4.3),
which provided the breakdown of various components of REST ’s slowdown. Especially in the case
of xalancwhich makes a high frequency of allocations (0.2 allocations per kilo-instructions), the
allocator overheads dominate significantly compared to other benchmarks. Benchmarks that use
the allocator more sparingly (lbm and sjeng, for instance, which make less than 10 allocation
calls overall) have little to negligible overheads.
These results additionally indicate that our allocator, based on ASan, is a major contributor
to REST ’s overhead. This is evidenced by the fact that the full and heap safe categories exhibit
almost equal overheads, differing only by 0.16% on average. Thus, if recompilation is an option
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for users, REST could provide stack safety at nominal extra cost. We chose to use the ASan
allocator for convenience; in the future, we plan to design a custom REST allocator that could
potentially mitigate some of the observed overheads.
The difference in runtimes for the secure and debug modes arises due to the fact that, in the
debug mode, we delay store commit until the corresponding write completes. In our simulated
out-of-order core, although the impacts of this change manifests in many ways, a few side-effects
were predominantly observed. First, unsurprisingly we found that the number of cycles the ROB
was blocked by a store was about an order of magnitude higher in the debug mode. IQ occupancy
was also severely affected for the latter case, especially for xalanc that had the number of cycles
IQ was full in the secure and debug modes differed by more than 100x. Notably, we also did not
observe a lot of traffic at the main memory interface due to token fills, indicating that most token
accesses hit in the cache and do not otherwise contribute to memory access bandwidth for any
of the benchmarks in either mode (only 0.04 tokens per kilo-instructions crossed the L2/memory
interface for xalanc in the secure full run).
Software vs. Hardware. To distinguish between the overheads added by our software and
hardware modifications, we run the REST binaries on stock hardware with one key modification
— each arm and disarm in the binaries is replaced by one regular store. This simulates a situation
wherein our REST hardware modifications for managing and checking tokens have zero cost. The
runtimes for this set of experiments are shown in Figure 4.8, denoted by the PerfectHW Full and
PerfectHWHeap bars. As these results show, the overheads incurred by the perfect REST hardware
are not significantly different from that seen in the secure mode, being only 0.2% lower for full
protection and for heap protection. This implies that the cost of the REST primitive in hardware
is nearly zero and that the entirety of the performance overheads in the secure mode are solely an
artifact of its software component, especially the allocator.
Token Widths. Token widths while affecting the security of a system might also potentially
affect its performance, since smaller token widths might allow better cache utilization. In order to
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Figure 4.10: Runtime overheads (over plain) of heap protection with dlmalloc. ASan/REST and
ASan results are also shown again for reference.
experiment for all modes. The corresponding results are shown in Figure 4.9. Overall, we see that
choosing any single token width does not make a significant difference in terms of performance.
In the general case, users might thus freely choose robustness in the form of wider tokens, without
compromising performance.
dlmalloc vs. ASan. We also ran the above experiments with our modified dlmalloc for heap
safety. Our baseline for these experiments was the plain binary run with regular glibc with the
original dlmalloc as the allocator. These results are shown in Figure 4.10. We notice that the
overheads are significantly lower for all benchmarks. Of note is xalanc, whose overheads drop
dramatically from 249% to 15%. With the new allocator, our overall slowdown drops to less than
4%.
4.6.2 FPGA Area Overheads
We implemented the REST modifications on the Leon3 SoC package, which consists of a SPARC32
V8 processor. Leon3 has one level of split data and instruction caches of 16B width, which are
not write allocate. So, for our modifications, we first change Leon3’s data cache to a write allocate
version, and implement the REST changes on top of it. For the sake of this analysis, we consider
the Leon3 cache with our write-allocate modifications to be our base design. The design was then
synthesized and implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-7 based VC707 board.
Overall, we added less than 200 lines of VHDL to the data cache’s RTL. The modifications did
not affect timing and added ~100 LUTs to the synthesized design.
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4.7 Related Work
Memory safety implies two types of protections — spatial and temporal. Spatial memory errors
usually manifest in two different ways depending on program behavior. Overflow-style errors
are a result of a sweeping or linear access pattern wherein the code sequentially starts accessing
locations beyond the bounds of the data structure. Alternatively, invalid reads/writes might also
occur if a pointer is corrupted/overwritten resulting in a access pattern that can be more precise
or targeted. Protection schemes can be characterized depending on which pattern they detect. In
terms of temporal protection, schemes can be characterized by the time window within which
their protection lasts. Some schemes provide complete protection by detecting dangling pointers
for the duration of the entire execution, while others only do so until the invalid region has been
reallocated again.
Since memory safety has been a persistent problem for decades, a lot of work has been done
to address it, especially in software [114]. In this section, we only discuss relevant hardware
techniques proposed towards solving this problem (summarized in Table 4.3) below.
• Bounds Checking. Hardware-based bounds checking [36, 45, 79, 80] solutions were proposed
to mitigate the problems of high performance overhead associated with software enforced bounds-
checking [54, 81, 82] while retaining its effectiveness. They were quite successful in this regard,
bringing down the performance penalty significantly (Hardbound [36] reported considerably lower
overheads than the others but does not provide temporal safety). There are a few differences
between them and REST , however. This is because of the fact that while bounds-checking performs
complete monitoring of out-of-bounds accesses (assuming pointer identification in hardware is
perfect), REST only detects errors when the blacklisted locations are accessed and hence, provides
weaker security guarantees. The advantages of the latter approach, however, are lower overheads
and complexity.
Firstly, REST ’s memory overhead scales with the number of protected data structures, not
pointers to them, and does not need separate memory to do so. We also do not require storage
in the chip itself, other than a register at the L1 data cache. On the other hand, most previous
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works store metadata in a shadow space, a memory region containing metadata for every location
of the address space. This results in fast metadata access since calculating its location inside the
shadow space is derivable by a simple arithmetic operation on the pointer address. But it is also
highly inefficient in terms of storage since all of the address space is shadowed even if a negligible
fraction of it is actually occupied by pointers. Watchdog [79] andWatchdoglite [80] reported ~56%
increase in memory usage for SPEC CPU benchmarks. In terms of on-chip storage, all schemes,
with the exception of Watchdoglite, introduce some form of fast-lookup memory, such as caches,
in order to speed up metadata lookup and hence, pointer operations.
Most of these schemes also introduce non-trivial hardware logic to the chip microarchitecture.
Hardbound and Watchdog inject micro-op around memory accesses instructions at runtime. Safe-
Proc and Watchdoglite, on the other hand, rely on the compiler to explicitly insert instructions in
the program to this end, enabling static analyses to optimize these operations. Furthermore, Watch-
dog logically extends the physical register file to accommodate metadata, whereas the others use
existing registers, thus increasing register pressure. REST ’s detection logic is vastly simpler since
we do not perform checks for spatial and temporal violations in the pipeline for every memory ac-
cess. Since we defer the detection responsibilities completely to the caches, the core architecture
itself remains unchanged, also making register pressure a non-issue.
Additionally, reliance on compiler support implies these systems have limited composability
with software (such as third-party libraries) which have not undergone the necessary static trans-
formations. This means they necessarily require shared libraries that have been compiled similarly.
Critically however, a kernel that is unaware of this scheme could cause errors and presents a po-
tential vulnerability for such systems. For instance, an attacker could influence the size arguments
of a data-manipulating syscall to corrupt sensitive data. Since REST associates metadata with the
data structure and not its pointers, we do not have to worry about static pointer analyses (or their
accuracy). The compiler support necessary for REST is, hence, significantly simpler (LLVM’s
ASan module has only 2129 LoC with our modifications).
Notably, Intel Memory Protection Extensions (MPX) [53] marks the first commercial support
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for this technique. However, it faces a few compatibility issues and exhibits high performance
overheads [86].
• Tagging. Some defenses “color” memory regions by associating tags with them and checking
these tags when they are accessed. HDFI [107] marks memory locations with a 1-bit tag, that
subsequently indicates whether that location can be accessed via regular load/stores. Although it
is quite flexible and exhibits nominal overhead, its hardware requirements are higher than ours.
SPARC ADI [48] uses a 4-bit coloring scheme, using the 4 most significant bits of a 64b pointer
for this purpose. On an access, the hardware checks whether the tags of the pointer and accessed
regions match. They also require a custom allocator responsible for coloring heap allocations
but do not require that programs be recompiled to avail this feature. Although full details of the
microarchitecture have not been disclosed, at a minimum they require 4 bits of metadata per cache
line at all cache levels. Spatial overflows are prevented by annotating adjacent allocations and
their metadata with different tags, while temporal overflows are prevented by changing tags on
deallocation. However, due to the limited number of available tags, memory regions might reuse
tags after being reallocated enough times (via heap feng-shui attacks [108], for instance) after
which dangling pointer access will go undetected. Moreover, since they modify pointer format,
(legacy) programs that do special pointer operations involving compression or irregular arithmetic
will be incompatible with this technology. We do not face these problems.
• Capabilities. Capability-based architectures [120, 126] are another metadata-based secure hard-
ware design that offer stronger security guarantees than us. Here, all pointers are augmented with
metadata that goes beyond bounds information (permission, for instance). Particularly, works in
the CHERI project [22, 126] have demonstrated its applicability in the modern era on a whole-
system level, not just for applications, for a MIPS 64-bit in-order processor. However, this support
comes at the expense of high performance and area overheads, although the authors acknowledge
open areas of optimization in their design.
• Watchpoints. This class of solutions aim to provide a high number of hardware data watch-
points, primarily for debugging. iWatcher [128] was one of the first hardware techniques proposed
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to this end and functionally provided support for a high (but limited) number of programmable
hardware watchpoints at a relatively low overhead compared to some software solutions, but re-
quired that the affected physical pages be pinned to physical memory and not be swapped out.
Although they did not explore memory safety as an application, Greathouse et al. [47] solved both
problems by providing unlimited watchpoints and allowed pages to be swapped out by storing
metadata separately.
• Others. SafeMem [96] repurposed error checking ECC bits in main memory to mark memory
locations invalid in order to detect spatial memory errors. They did so by setting the parity state
to an error value, so that accesses to those locations trigger exceptions, thus trading reliability
for safety. However, each set/unset operation is quite expensive with latencies comparable to an
mprotect syscall. Additionally, it did not support the swapping main memory contents to disk.
Memtracker [119] associates state with each memory location by monitoring accesses to them.
They however, do not make any modifications to the allocator to inhibit allocation reuse, and so
are more vulnerable to temporal attacks. Besides the above solutions, ARM recently announced
pointer authentication in select chips [97] that counter pointer corruption and forging, but do not
protect against general temporal or spatial attacks.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed REST , a primitive for content based checks and showed how it can be
used to creae a low complexity, low overhead implementation for improving memory safety. REST
itself requires local modifications that integrates within existing hardware intefaces. It incurs a low
performance penalty for stack and heap safety, which is 22-90% faster than comparable state-of-
the-art software implementations, while additionally being more secure and providing heap safety
for legacy binaries.
There are many open areas of optimization and extension to REST . The REST software com-
ponents viz., the repurposed Address Sanitizer allocator, accounts for almost all of the slowdown
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in the secure mode. An allocator designed to take advantage of REST properties and requirements
could be significantly faster. Similarly, for hardware, our goals was to minimize number of opti-
mizations: however, a few additional microarchitectural optimizations such as a dedicated cache
for REST lines has potential to decrease overheads further, especially for the debug mode and for
programs that make frequent allocations. Finally, we only explore REST at the application level in
this chapter; extending and supporting it at the system level and for heterogeneous architectures,
will increase system security and reliability.
The benefits of REST go well beyond memory safety. As a primitive for performing content-
based checks in hardware, it provides a number of opportunities not only for improving other
aspects of software security (e.g., control flow), but also programmability and performance. De-
















Hardbound [36] Complete None ✓ ✗ Low µop injection, L1 cache & TLB
for tags
SafeProc [45] Complete Complete ✗ ✗ Low Multiple CAMs and memory
units, hardware hash table, hash
table walker
Watchdog [79] Complete Complete ✓ ✗ Moderate µop injection, pointer lock-ID
cache, dangling pointer monitor
Watchdoglite [80] Complete Complete ✓ ✗ Moderate Nominal
Intel MPX [53] Complete None ✗ ✗† High Not known
HDFI [107] Linear None ✓ ✓ Negligible Wider buses and cache lines,
tag-aware memory controller
with caches, tag table
ADI [48] Linear‡ Until
realloc‡
✗ ✓ Negligible 4b per cache line at all cache
levels‡
CHERI [126] Complete Complete ✗ ✗ Moderate Capability coprocessor tightly
integrated with in-order pipeline
iWatcher [128] N/A N/A ✗ ✓ High Per-byte cache line metadata, a
multi-entry table, small meta-




N/A N/A ✗ ✓ High Range cache, metadata TLB
Safemem [96] Linear None ✗ ✓ High Repurpose DRAM’s error-
correction bits
Memtracker [119] Linear Until re-
alloc





Targeted None ✗ ✓ Negligible Not known
REST Linear Until re-
alloc
✗ ✓ Moderate 1 metadata bit per L1-D line, 1
comparator
Table 4.3: Comparison of previous hardware techniques (assuming single-core systems for sim-
plicity). †AlthoughMPX-supported binaries execute with modules that are not protected, metadata
is dropped when such modules manipulate an MPX-augmented pointer. ‡See text.
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CHAPTER 5
Address Space as a Primary Line of Defense
The virtual address space is a fundamental abstraction in computer systems, the properties it grants
and its implementation being uniform across architectures. Programs executing in this environ-
ment can use virtual addresses to access content in any location, as long as these properties are
not violated. Valid generation and usage of addresses follow strict but simple rules, such as lin-
ear progression of addresses and page granularity of permissions, that are derived from the same
properties. Software attacks, which run within the context of the program, are also bound to these
same rules and abuse them at runtime to achieve their goals.
In this chapter, we argue that these rules of generating valid addresses are overly liberal. In-
stead, we propose and define an alternative address space abstraction, called the apparent address
space (AAS), that makes statically unintended usage and generation of addresses harder at run-
time, thus limiting the capabilities of runtime attacks. Subsequently, we propose some hardware
implementations for this idea, and conclude that, although the idea may sound novel in theory, the
implementation cost does not justify the benefits, when viewed as a standalone defense mechanism.
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5.1 Introduction
Current principles of program execution are tightly coupled to the notion of an address space.
In this respect, “address” is a form of information used by the program. While most addresses
are statically baked into the program, it is also made available dynamically (to a degree that is
architecture-dependent). Like the program itself, most attacks leverage this very fact by, implicitly
or explicity, extracting and using address-related information available at runtime via what we term
the address-interface to bypass defense measures.
Virtual address space (VAS) is a highly entrenched concept in modern system and application
design, wherein each program operates in an isolated, sanitized view of its accessible memory. This
view of the VAS has an implicit property — a system-wide consensus that address progression is
a linear sequence. Thus, the “next” location can be calculated by simply incrementing the current
address, whereas the “previous” location is the result of a simple decrement. Formally, given a
location x, the locations before and after can be calculated with the following sequence-functions.
previous(x) = x− 1
next(x) = x+ 1
(5.1)
Thus, code executes in a straight line (i.e., fetches instructions from subsequent memory ad-
dresses) unless explicit control-flow change occurs, and data of size greater than native types
(strings, structs, etc.) are arranged contiguously. This agreement allows various architectural,
system, and compiler optimizations to be engineered towards efficient and performant program
execution.
The fact that virtual-addresses progress in a linear sequence can, however, be exploited allow-
ing an attacker to blindly probe or stride the address-space in order to leak or corrupt program
state. Consider the classic attack of return address corruption via a buffer overflow vulnerability.
In this case, the attack overflows the exploitable buffer to reach the return address slot. While this
is a result of the operational design of stack frame layouts, it can also be generally ascribed to the
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fact that programs are architecturally presented a flat view of the virtual address space. Underlying
these attacks is the implicit knowledge of the fact that not only are the sequence functions publicly
known, but they are also quite simple and uniform, even across architectures. This gives rise to
unintended and traversable proximities among locations of memory objects (code or data), that are
not always a program requirement and exist solely as an artifact of the linear nature of the address
space. The only hard deterrent to invalid linear accesses is enforced at the page granularity, which
in many cases is too coarse and easily surmountable.
To make matters worse, addresses are also often embedded into the program itself or injected
explicitly or implicitly. When leaked, these can then provide the basis for attacks to access other
adjacent locations using the VAS sequence functions.
In this chapter, we posit that granting this degree of latitude when it comes to specifying and
enumerating addresses is not only overly simplistic and unnecessary, but even harmful from a
security perspective. To mitigate these problems while keeping implementation costs low, we pro-
pose the apparent address space (AAS) as an abstraction layer over the traditional virtual address
space (VAS). As with the physical and virtual address abstractions, programs can only view the
AAS, while the system backend is aware of the VAS. Additionally, the AAS possesses certain
properties that makes implicitly imposes memory protection at a fine granularity. As we attempt
to deal with the challenges of a hardware-software design of this, we, however, realize that the
benefits it provides relative to other works in the area are not commensurate to the complexity of
its implementation.
5.2 Motivation
In this section, we define the address interface in more detail, outlining how it is a seldom consid-
ered but crucial aspect of program execution as well as software attacks. We will then propose an
address space abstraction that significantly reduces the scope of this interface, making it hard for
statically unintended behavior, as is leveraged in software attacks.
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5.2.1 The Address Interface
Address is an architectural alias for identifying locations and their contents uniquely. In the context
of user-space programs, this corresponds to the virtual address. We define the runtime address
generation interface (AGI) as the means by which a program can derive and/or generate addresses
at runtime. There are broadly two aspects to it.
Injected Addresses. First among these are the addresses embedded or injected into the pro-
gram directly. These are the primary sources of addresses in the program and can be introduced
into the program by the following means.
• Via compilation and loading. The compiler framework embeds jump offsets and address
variables in the program. Part of this responsibility is also shared by the loader for position-
independent code and dynamic loading.
• Via syscalls. Syscalls are the conduit for processes to interact with the outside world and
manage available resources. As such, the OS will often introduce new, valid addresses into
a program as defined by the syscall interface. For instance, heaps are initially allocated
through a syscall (mmap or brk on Unix based systems) and subsequently managed by a
memory manager.
• Via architectural vectors. Some architectural registers, like the frame-pointer, stack-pointer,
and program counter, may also expose addresses to the program, directly or indirectly. Addi-
tionally, some ISA operations, like function calls and exceptions, also inject valid addresses
into the process’ purview.
Generated Addresses. A secondary source of addresses in the program are the new ones that
are generated from primary addresses noted above via the sequence functions. This is a critical
property of the AGI because it allows the program to represent and specify contents of non-native
sizes with a single “name”. Hence, an array can be represented with the address of the first lo-
cation; the location of any subsequent element is obtained as an offset from the head element.
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Similarly, an entire function of code can be represented with just the function address. Given this
one representational alias, the locations of the rest of the content (e.g., other elements in the ar-
ray or instructions in the function) can be calculated using the sequence functions. Without them,
non-native memory objects would have to be individually specified, making programming as we
know it infeasible. The VAS, regardless of underlying architecture, universally follows the simple
sequence functions defined in Eqn. 5.1.
Thus, the AGI can be completely specified using the explicit address sources and sequence
functions mentioned above, with minor variations depending on the platform, ABI, etc.1
5.2.2 Exploiting the AGI
Since software attacks work within the context of the program, they also use the AGI. Depending
on the vulnerabilites and vectors, they do so using one or a combination of the following tech-
niques:
1 Leak valid address. Memory disclosures can occur as a result of a myriad of reasons,
ranging from programming bugs to language stipulations to architectural ABI regulations, or a
combination of them. Although many defenses have been proposed against them, the sheer variety
of their causes makes coming up with comprehensive generic solutions a hard endeavor.
2 Hijack one or more of the program’s address usage gadgets. Often vulnerabilities result in
attackers being able to manipulate memory access code snippets in the program. For instance,
an attack could utilize an overflow bug in a program loop to make out-of-bounds reads/writes.
Alternatively, if he can control the input address to the loop, program state can be easily leaked or
corrupted [50].
3 Inject/reuse code. With this powerful capability, the attacker is able to inject arbitrary code
into the program or execute snippets of the program’s own code to achieve the same functionality.
Getting to this point is generally preceded by one or both of the previous steps.
Even with memory disclosures, malicious attempts at reading or modifying the targeted, sensi-
1Since we consider contents at the machine, raw memory level, we discount languages from the discussion.
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tive memory objects rarely pan out in the very first step and in practice, proceed in stages employ-
ing any or all of the means stated above. Regardless of the methods or operational requirements,
attacks usually try to “reach” the object of interest from another object that the attacker did gain
access to or can control. This general principle of traversing is widely applicable and used both in
the wild as well as in research. For instance, this theme is the fundamental premise of all overflow
attacks. The Heartbleed bug [31], affected OpenSSL 1.0.1, used a classic buffer overflow vulner-
ability using the innocuous heartbeat object to reach more sensitive data. Alternatively, a widely
used category of egg-hunting shellcode [77] scans the address space for the injected code to jump
into. In the research domain, some recently published attacks [14, 106] scan the code memory to
dynamically harvest gadgets in order to execute a code-reuse attack [101].
Since memory disclosures themselves are a shifting gap to plug due to the widely varying
nature of its causal factors, the AGI is a more promising target for hardening, especially since its
properties are highly uniform and widely applicable. Hence, in line with the principle of least
privilege and information, the ideal goal of securing this interface is to reveal only those addresses
necessary for execution, as foreseen by the developer and encoded in the program semantics. Any
other address value should not be exposed via injection or in-program generation.
5.3 Related Work
Randomization is popularly considered a measure to counter predictable program layout. However,
most of recent proposals in this direction have targeted code at different granularities [63]. Some
schemes have specifically targeted the heap [9, 85] and the stack [20, 89], while a few schemes have
targeted data layout in general [10, 18, 67]. Even so, the coarse granularity of page permissions
and their static nature implies that static randomization can be subverted with runtime memory
scanning [106]. The recently proposed hardware based data randomization scheme, HARD [8],
creates equivalence classes of data with context sensitive static analyses and encrypts the different
classes separately. It is, hence, somewhat resilient to runtime scanning, but still suffers from
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pathological problems arising from inaccuracy of the compiler analysis, in which case pointers
to equivalent data structures can point to any structure in the class.
Bounds-checking is also an oft-explored idea in this regard. Software versions of it are inef-
fective against the adversary outlined by our threat model. Hardware enforced fat-pointers [36,
45, 79, 80] are not only expensive and complicated, but are based on a flawed assumption – the
attacker always receives a properly created pointer and cannot otherwise create or manipulate the
creation of one. This is not the case for our powerful adversary. Capabilities [120, 126] have also
been shown to be effective in this regard. But they require significant hardware re-engineering, so
we will discount them from this discussion.
Alternatively, hardware tripwire schemes [96, 105, 107] implement the much simpler primitive
allowing the program to mark certain memory regions invalid. The program then utilizes it to
mark certain data or the memory around it invalid. Although these techniques present very low
overheads, they can be easily bypassed by simply jumping over the invalidated regions (assuming
their locations are known) while traversing the address space.
5.4 Apparent Address Space
Seeing how the AGI can be abused by attackers, it becomes pertinent for us to judiciously expose
it to the program. In order to limit the degree of information available through it, we propose the
apparent address space (AAS), which is an abstraction over the virtual address space but does
not expose sequential addressing (as shown in Eqn. 5.1). Instead the AAS exhibits the following
sequence functions,
xAA = fkey(xVA)
previous(xAA) = fkey(xVA +m)




















Figure 5.1: Apparent Address Space as an Abstraction over the Virtual Address Space.
, wherem is the sequence granularity and f is the hashing function that uses the key, key. The
algorithm of f is publicly known, but key is secret at the user level. It is, however, known to the
compilation framework and runtime back-end including the hardware.
Imposing such a stipulation over the program conservatively limits the capabilities of any entity
operating within it, malicious or benign. Furthermore, keeping f a secret also has the following
side-effects.
1 Given the location of one or more memory objects, the location of another is not deriv-
able by statistical or empirical correlation (inference property). f essentially “randomizes” the
address space at the granularity of m. Hence, this scheme subsumes the benefits of fine-grained
randomization for both code and data. Assuming f is irreversible, this property prevents attackers
from directly inferring addresses of memory objects adjacent or semantically unrelated to the ones
directly under control. Note that this does not affect a (well-structured) program however, since
legitimate code explicitly encodes the data flow so that it has address of the memory object when
necessary.
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2 Attempts at accessing a location blindly are forbidden and/or caught (whitelisting prop-
erty). The VAS (at least for 64-bit addres spaces) is quite sparse, so that most locations actually map
to unallocated pages. Assuming f uniformly hashes all addresses, most AAs should, hence, cor-
respond to invalid addresses. Furthermore, ifm is small enough this property essentially prohibits
blind address-enumeration. This is significant since given that the attacker lacks the capability of
deriving locations of objects without leaking them directly, this property prevents the alternative,
which is to employ some guided probing mechanism to reach other possible locations. Thus prob-
abilistic attacks techniques like memory scanning and buffer overflows are ineffective. Again and
for the same reason as before, the actual program should be unaffected by this property.
5.4.1 Security Implications
As a corollary, the two properties outlined above in turn enforce the following property on the
program.
Exact address of a memory object must be known to access it.
Incidentally, this also outlines the goal of spatial memory safety, which essentially treats every
pointer as a unique key which can open the lock to and access only the data structure it points to.
In other words, a pointer to a memory object may only dereference to the memory region within
object. The AAS functionally achieves the same because of the whitelisting property. It addition-
ally goes beyond memory safety with the inference property, wherein an ideal AAS also makes
it impossible to create new pointers to valid memory unless the exact memory location is known.
Traditionaly memory safety definitions do not regulate pointer creation (although capability based
architectures do).
While the effect of the above property on data is clear, applying them to code has an interest-
ing consequence. Specifically, if a code address is disclosed (by leaking a function pointer, for
instance), addresses of subsequent (or previous) instructions cannot be enumerated, thus obviating
code scanning and attacks that rely on it [106].
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5.4.2 Challenges
There are two major lines of challenges that a practical implementation of AAS would have to
face.
• Hardware Based Challenges. The hardware-software system hierarchy has seen decades worth
of optimization aimed at streamlining VAS functionality. As such, a system design from scratch
to support the AAS is untenable. Hence, the first challenge is to maintain the current architecture
as much as possible and implement the AAS on top. Our decision to implement AAS as another
abstraction level on top of the VAS would largely take care of this concern. All this would entail,
then, is to perform the AA-VA translation at the appropriate interface, thus mostly obviating design
changes in the software and hardware infrastructure behind. We discuss particulars in the next
section.
• Programming Construct Based Challenges. A critical aspect of programs that we have avoided
discussing so far are sequential data structures (henceforth referred to as arrays, for simplicity). The
main challenge of AAS is the following: how do we represent arrays, which are semantically se-
quential, with a single representational alias (or name) in the fundamentally non-sequential AAS?
Arrays are an unavoidable construct of programming languages and a fast representation for them
is critical. As the traditional addition-based offsets no longer apply in the AAS, an alternative is
essential for practical feasibility. Simultaneously, we have to make sure that this alternative cannot
be abused by an attacker to access illegitimate locations in the program. In other words, we have
to ensure that any concessions or mechanism granted by the AAS does not give attackers a means
to bypassing its protections and thus, violating its core properties.
One obvious way of enforcing the inference property is by employing layout randomization
comprehensively on every aspect of the program (code and data), at as low a granularity as possible.
Owing to the multitude of randomization techniques available, this would require usage of multiple
schemes. Even so, due to the flat nature of the address space and the fact that memory objects are
packed together, this solution would be vulnerable to memory scanning, allowing cross-over from
one object to another. The key reason for this is that there is no detection mechanism built into
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such a system.
Techniques that satisfy the whitelisting property could be the solution to this problem. Insert-
ing large redzones or invalid pages between memory objects could solve this, but this has a high
memory overhead. But they can just be jumped over if an attacker has prior knowledge of their
presence. Additionally, some syscalls allow the program to probe whether an address lies on an
invalid page without crashing the program (see [77]). Alternatively, a bounds-checking scheme
could also prohibit cross-overs. However, such schemes do not seek to uphold the inference prop-
erty by hiding pointer values. Furthermore, the hardware does not validate the bounds aggresively
by authenticating whether they actually correspond to the object being pointed to, thus compound-
ing the problem. So, once an address is leaked, the attacker could infer the location of other objects
and subsequently control/create pointers to access them. In other words, pointer forging and ma-
nipulation are theoretically possible, which would violate the whitelisting property. Hence, we see
that while there already exists ways of partially achieving the AAS properties, none satisfy both
entirely, leaving fundamental loopholes in the design.
5.5 Implementation
In this section, we will outline a few design options for implementing AAS with different trade-
offs. Notably, our designs will be based on already existing technologies, so integration costs can
be minimized.
5.5.1 Hardware Design
The first design point addresses how we enforce the sequence functions (Eqn. 5.2) and the hashing
function, f . Since address translation is a very common phenomenon during execution, ideally f
should be able to complete within a single cycle so that the timing requirements of some pipeline
stages are not stressed. For our purpose, we choose f to be a combination of the XOR and/or bit
scrambling. Notably, ARM’s pointer authentication already allows pointer encryption with some
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low-overhead encryption schemes [97], which we could utilize2. Every binary would have a key
associated with it, that will be used to encrypt/decrypt addresses as specified by Eqn. 5.2. For
simplicity, the encryption granularity,m, can be equal to the native data width.
The design thus far establishes AAS as an abstraction over the VAS, so that the actual memory
layout of the program, the supporting software and hardware infrastructure do not have to change
much beyond the address decryption around the execute stage of pipeline. As we discuss later,
some additional architectural modifications also have to be made regarding pointer operations.
Hence, in order to support arrays, we change the way addition based offset calculation to include
decryption and encryption before and after.
However, this still does not solve the problem of overflows. Any mechanism used to calculate
offsets within an array can also be used to calculate addresses outside, enabling overflow situations.
This, therefore, essentially allows the program a glimpse of the VAS and the layout within, thus
violating the whitelisting property at the least, and also the inference property, depending on the
context.
To solve this issue, we utilize a tagging mechanism, similar to ones recently announced by
SPARC [48] and ARM [3]. Consequently, we require that arrays or any objects bigger than the
native data size be tagged with a “color”, and all pointers to those objects carry the color in them.
A pointer dereference is only valid if it is to a memory region of the same color (as shown in
Figure 5.2). Colorless pointers are used for native data types and should not be operated on beyond
the native width. As far as hardware overhead is concerned, the above techniques only support
64-bit architectures and embed the pointer tag into the higher order address bits of the pointer
value. Furthermore, memory is also logically extended to associate tags with each location, with
which the pointer tags are matched. So far, these are common features among comparable tagging
mechanisms.
One corner case that presents a slight complication in our design is that of pointer comparison.
2However, their encryption requires an additional context key, which we may not require. Instead, we could use a







Figure 5.2: Tagging scheme employed for coloring memory objects in AAS.
In a linear VAS, this operation made logical sense, while in the AAS, it does not. Semantically
speaking, pointer comparison only makes sense if its operands belong to the same higher memory
object. In keeping with this line of reasoning, we allow pointer comparisons only if the two pointers
have the same color.
Limitations. The VAS fundamentally does not support the entire C memory model due to its
non-linearity. This includes addition-based pointer arithmetic and pointer comparisons as noted
above. By the C pointer model, pointers are also allowed to be modified as long as they point
back to the right area at dereference. Our design does not accommodate this for native pointers.
Additionally, this design does not support dynamic linking in its current form.
Architectural Interface. The above modifications mandate a few changes in the architectural
interface exposed to the program. Firstly, as with the base tagging architectures, tag creation and
manipulation instructions have to be introduced. Secondly, new pointer arithmetic instructions also
have to be supported with the properties stated above since traditional integer add, subtract, and
logical compare operations would no longer be valid. Thirdly, all architectural addresses injected
into program (through the stack pointer register, return addresses, etc.) have to be encrypted with
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the program’s address-encryption key.
5.5.2 Software Support
To support the AAS, we need the following changes in the supporting software infrastructure.
Compiler and Linker. The compiler has to convert all variable accesses to pointer accesses
and assign colors to them according to type, and change pointer arithmetic to use the special
instructions described above. The stack epilogues and prologues also have to be modified to reflect
this. Furthermore, all direct addresses, if any, have to be encrypted by the linker with the AAS key.
Operating System. The OS has to maintain the key as part of the process information and
convert all incoming and outgoing addresses (via syscalls and interrupts) accordingly.
Note that the modifications outlined above implement a naive support. We did not seek to make
any optimizations in this flow. For instance, it is possible to identify variables that are safe from
being corrupted, and allow direct accesses to them instead of through a pointer to it. Exploring
similar optimizations could yield significant performance improvements to the design.
5.5.3 Security Evaluation
• Tag Width. In an ideal implementation, there would be an infinite number of colors that can be
associated with data structures, so that reuse of colors is never an issue. Practically, however, tag
width limits how many colors can be assigned leading to color reuse. Color reuse is a risk since
they can be exploited to mount temporal attacks.
• Reversing f . Depending on the robustness of the encryption function, f , it is possible to reverse
it, especially if weak encryption schemes like XOR and bit scrambling are used. This could be
easily achieved if one or more pointers to an array object can be obtained and enough addresses
within it can be harvested. Hence, the exact scheme to use for f becomes a performance vs.
security trade-off for the architect.
• Pointer Hopping. To have a pointer to an array object is to have complete access over it. So, a
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situation could arise where one obtains a pointer to an object, containing other pointers, which are
then successively followed to reveal enough information about the program state. Our design of
the AAS is ineffective against such an attack.
5.5.4 Feasibility
To understand the value of this technique, we have to ask ourselves what does this abstraction
give us over current memory safety techniques? Specifically, for the sake of this discussion, if we
assume we are leveraging the mechanisms provided by a tagging scheme like SPARC ADI, we
have to determine how much of an additional security is added by AAS compared to a system that
has ADI? From a practicality standpoint, this is important because performance-wise our scheme
would be slower.
Memory safety in a program is a very strong defensive guarantee. Although the tagging
schemes do not provide ideal memory safety, they are practically very secure, nonetheless. Added
to this the fact that they have negligible slowdown, we unfortunately could not determine the prac-
tical security benefits for an AAS. This is despite the fact that purely in terms of hardware overhead
and complexity, we would be comparable to present tagging architectures.
5.6 Conclusion
Addresses are a fundamental tenet of program execution, its usage guided by certain rules imposed
by the virtual address space. Just like the processes themselves, software attacks follow the same
rules at runtime to enumerate addresses according to the address generation interface. As such,
securing this interface should seemingly go a long way in system security.
In this chapter, we argued for tightening of the guidelines governing address generation within
the virtual address space in order to secure the program. To this end, we proposed an alternate view
of the address space, called the apparent address space, whose properties automatically impose spa-
tial memory safety on the program. Furthermore, we highlighted the challenges in achieving it and
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put forward an exemplary implementation it which utilizes established prior work and more impor-
tantly, does not require scrapping decades worth of optimizations aimed towards virtual addressing.
However, the performance and implementation overhead introduced due to this abstraction was not
deemed justifiable, especially compared to state-of-the-art in commercial memory safety hardware
measures. It is possible, however, that novel attacks may be developed in the future that might




The state of system security has reached an inflexion point wherein the traditional methods of
defenses are unable to keep up with the conflicting usage requirements of providing protection
against an ever expanding arsenal of threats, while managing to keep a low profile themselves.
This is a great opportunity for hardware engineers to contribute in this domain, to which they
have largely remained oblivious and insulated in the past. Both in research and industry, there is
a realization that addition of appropriate hardware features could potentially make a significant
difference from a security perspective. As welcome as this realization is, practical concerns dictate
which techniques can be ultimately translated to commercial deployment.
To that end, in this dissertation, I assert that hardware support for system security, that have
been traditionally implemented in software, need not be complex in order to be effective. In fact,
I even argue that simplicity should be one of the primary design goals while engineering any
defensive measure in hardware. In this dissertation, I have outlined three case studies to support
this position. In the first case study, we secure code by designing simple hardware support for a
classic technique called instruction set randomization to prevent state-of-the-art code reuse attacks,
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against which it was traditionally considered impotent. In the second case study, we propose a low-
overhead, low-complexity hardware primitive, and use it to secure data against common types of
memory safety violations. And finally, in the third study, we discuss a proposal to modify the
address space to present a non-linear sequence of addresses to the program, but determine that the
implementation overhead for such a design would unfavorably outweigh the cost of its security
benefits, and thus violate the thesis outlined above.
6.1 Lessons Learned
Besides the points of simplicity and cost effectiveness made throughout this dissertation, I conclude
with a few lessons realized during my studies that hardware engineers should consider and software
engineers should be cognizant of while proposing and designing hardware defenses in the future.
Flexibility Aids Longevity. As emphasized repeatedly in the dissertation, the domain of se-
curity is constantly in flux, with ever newer threats and novel vectors for exploiting classic ones
emerging at a break-neck pace compared to the rate at which hardware features evolve. Thus it is
a considerable challenge for hardware security engineers to predict the state of security years into
the future while proposing a defense that will be relevant for that period. In the worse case, a tech-
nique could be rendered useless either due to the availability of a better or comparable alternative
software defense or just by the fact that the state-of-the-art for that threat has moved beyond the
feature the defensive measure targets. One of the best ways to mitigate this problem and making
the technique somewhat future-proof is to introduce a high degree of flexibility in it. Flexibility
in the solution implies it is capable of being used in scenarios that have not been foreseen by its
developers at the time of proposal or design, thus allowing it to adapt to new forms of the same
or similar threats in the future. Two approaches to achieving this is to either make the defense
inherently programmable or allow software to define and set its usage policies. Instances of the
former are the general purpose taint tracking accelerators proposed recently [37].
With REST, we take the latter approach wherein our entire defense depends on a hardware
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primitive, which by itself is not necessarily security-oriented. The where, when, and how of us-
ing this primitive is entirely managed by software, thus granting the technique a high degree of
flexibility over time. For instance, if the software decides to implement a policy of enforcing
more security, this can be easily achieved by planting more tokens and/or by adding an element
of randomness as to where tokens are planted. The drawback to this approach, however, is that of
privilege, i.e., any attacker operating at the same level as the managing software can potentially
manipulate how the tokens are distributed. Hence, we observe again that there is no silver bullet—
the effectiveness of any solution can only be measured in terms of contextual and operational
trade-offs.
Multipurpose Solutions are Desirable. Defense in depth is an age-old adage in security. It
is an acknowledgement of the fact that no single security technique can stop all threats; so system
defense is just a question of stacking techniques one over another in orde to raise the bar high
enough that exploiting the system presents an unfavorable cost-vs-benefit ratio for the attacker.
So, naturally, the more angles of defense a technique presents, the better its defensive value. This
is not typical for most previously proposed solutions which are targeted towards one and only
one problem. This is a hard quality to impart a solution because often different types of threats
do not contain any common feature (although in order to chain the entire attack, one might be a
prerequisite for another). So, it is better to do one job well and (reasonably) succeed than attempt
many and fail at all. However, when possible, such an avenue could be worth exploring, if it makes
practical and economic sense.
With this in mind, we have designed Polyglot to have multiple defensive angles. Preventing
runtime code reuse does not require the asymmetric encryption of keys (used to symmetrically
encrypt code) in the binary with the device’s own unique key. In fact, had that been the only
goal, having this feature negatively impacts all aspects of the design’s evaluation. However, we
considered the addition of that design point reasonable because we considered the consequent
cost-benefit trade-off practical. Specifically, we consider the tying of code to a particular hardware
instance beneficial despite the small performance, area, and power overhead it incurred. The two
103
points of preventing code reuse and drive-by download style attacks are mutually exclusive and
have traditionally required different solutions. However in our case, we could achieve both by
introducing a small incremental unit in our design.
Make it Lucrative for All Parties. This point emphasizes the overarching narrative of hard-
ware design in general and reiterates all the points made earlier on a broader scale. It is ultimately
the needs of the market that decides the worth of a feature. Hardware and software developers have
to work in tandem to deliver features that are demanded by the users to the extent that it makes eco-
nomic sense. As such, the ecosystem involves multiple players, and it is the job of the designer to
come up with a feature that satisfies and balances all their needs. This means that the feature should
satisfy the following parties thus. One, the user demands performance and energy-efficiency from
the technique. To make matters challenging still, since security is not yet a primary concern among
a significant portion of the consumer base, these bounds can be tighter for defensive features than
say, usability or purely performance optimizations. Secondly, the software developer demands
convenience of feature integration. This is primarily due to the prevalence of legacy code and the
high inertia of changing established work flows. This can be achieved in many ways from adding
it automatically with compiler passes or making it available through small stand-alone code mod-
ules. And lastly, the hardware vendor demands ease and security of deployment. As we discuss
at the outset, this means that the technique should satisfy the concerns of effectiveness, longevity,
and complexity of implementation. Admittedly, listed as such, balancing all these diverse con-
cerns may seem like a daunting task. My belief, however, is that if we follow the thesis of this
dissertation, we will be able to design solutions that meet all of these criteria satisfactorily, thus
significantly and positively impacting the user in practice, which is our ultimate goal as computer
engineers at the end.
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Appendix
Algorithms Used to Leak XOR and Transposition Keys
• XOR. Since 128 bits covers 4 instructions, we have to accurately guess 4 instructions to figure
out the key. Additionally, since XOR does not have a “carry” effect, we can also guess the key
piecewise. For instance, we can guess two instructions from one location, and two from another
(while adhering to the 128-bit granularity) and combine the two portions to figure out the entire
key.
Since every fourth instruction is encrypted with the same key chunk, our approach was to try
XOR’ing every combination of instructions 4 words apart, and comparing it with the corresponding
value in the plaintext in the same function. For a match, XOR’ing the plaintext and the correspond-
ing cipher yields a possible value of the key. Without randomization, it would be trivial to match
pairs. With randomization however, it is more difficult to ascertain which corresponding matching
pairs. To overcome this, we use a simple frequency heuristic wherein we choose the key chunks
encountered most often. The actual algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1.
• Bit Transposition. Transposition was harder to break using simple heuristics than it was for
XOR. It becomes especially so if we try to guess the key using wrong key match-pairs. In other
words, even if we do get two sets of instructions, encrypted and the corresponding plaintext, we
might not get the key if do not match them in the right order. Our basic algorithm is shown below
in Algorithm 2.
Although checking validity of a likely key candidate was not difficult for us since we perform
a static analysis, practically the same can be achieved by verifying that decrypted words corre-
spond to valid SPARC instructions. Additionally, we fine-tune a few parameters (num_freq, for
instance) after some amount of experimentation. Note that we did not do any extensive analysis to
find the most efficient heuristics.
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Algorithm 1 Finding XOR Key
1: procedure FIND_XOR_KEY
2: for all randomized functions, randfunc, and corresponding function, origfunc do
3: funclen← length(origfunc)
4: origpairs← {orig1, orig2}, s.t. orig1, orig2 ∈ origfunc, and are 4 words apart
5: randpairs ← {rand1, rand2}, s.t. rand1, rand2 ∈ funclen instructions of randfunc, and are 4
words apart
6:
7: for all {orig1, orig2} ∈ origpairs and {rand1, rand2} ∈ randpairs do
8: if XOR(orig1, orig2) = XOR(rand1, rand2) then




13: if check_success() then







Algorithm 2 Finding Transposition Key
1: keys[i]← [0, 31],∀i ∈ [0, 31]
2:
3: procedure FIND_TRANSPOSITION_KEY
4: for all randomized functions, randfunc, and corresponding function, origfunc do
5: Generate rand_f such that rand_f [val] = {inst i} ∀ i that appears val times in randfunc
6: Generate orig_f such that orig_f [val] = {inst i} ∀ i that appears val times in origfunc
7: num_cands← minimum number of candidate instructions before brute-forcing is attempted
8: min_freq← minimum frequency of instruction before it is considered for brute-forcing







16: procedure GUESS(setA, setB)
17: for all x ∈ [0,len(setA)] do
18: inA← setA[x]
19: inB ← setB[x]
20: for all i ∈ [0, 31] do
21: bitA← (inA&(1≪ i))≫ i
22: for all j ∈ [0, 31] do
23: bitB ← (inB&(1≪ j))≫ j
24: if bitB 6= bitA then
25: keys[i].remove(j)







33: if VALIDATE(keys) then
34: return SUCCESS
35: end if
36: if !CHECK_PARTIAL_VALIDITY(keys) then
37: return FAIL
38: end if
39: if Set elements in keys small then ⊲ Try brute-forcing
40: for all key_comb ∈ keys do





46: return FAIL ⊲ Try again later
47: end procedure
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